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STATE ANTIQUITY LAWS AND ADMIRALTY SALVAGE:
PROTECTING OUR CULTURAL RESOURCES
ADAM LAWRENCE*
In this article the author analyzes the constitutional power
of the states to vest title to sunken artifacts in themselves. The
legal nature of sunken property and the conflicting state and
federal claims to which it is subject are examined through an
historical presentation of the statutory and common law pertain-
ing to sunken property. The author suggests how the possible
conflicts between federal maritime and state jurisdiction can be
resolved, both within the framework of the present law, and by
enacting new legislation on the state and federal levels.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Continental Shelves of the United States are richly en-
dowed with a resource that promises neither to augment declining
organic fuel reserves, nor to contribute to hard mineral self-
sufficiency. While the exchange value of the resource may on occa-
sion be significant, the resource which consists of sunken vessels and
cargoes derives its transcendent value as a repository of cultural
information.
It is arguably impossible to understand fully the demographic,
commercial and military history and development of the Americas
* LL.B., Rutgers University; LL.M., University of Miami; Member, Florida and New
Jersey Bars.
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during the centuries when the mass transit of people and goods was
dependent on river, lake, canal, and coastal waterways without an
understanding of the information contained in the marine record.
Certainly, the closer one approaches events of the pre-Columbian
era, the more significant becomes the mute historical testimony of
marine artifacts.)
It is thus surprising that so few cases have discussed the legal
issues surrounding the recovery of this unique, non-living marine
resource. The most recent case to do so, Treasure Salvors Inc. v.
Abandoned Sailing Vessel Believed to be the Nuestra Senora de
A tocha,2 concluded that traditional admiralty salvage principles
governed archaeological salvage on the Continental Shelf beyond
territorial waters. As will be shown, however, admiralty remedies
are an inadequate means of protecting cultural property.
Alternatives to traditional salvage remedies must be explored
and more of the uncertainty that surrounds the federal/state rela-
tionship in jurisdiction over marine antiquities must be resolved. To
do this, relevant state and federal statutory, common law and admi-
ralty principles applicable to lost and abandoned property and mar-
ine antiquities must be identified, analyzed and, if possible, recon-
ciled, so that a conservational approach to marine antiquities may
be developed.
IT. THE LEGAL NATURE OF SUNKEN PROPERTY
A. Abandonment and Dereliction in Admiralty
It is necessary to define at the outset the terms "derelict" and
"abandoned" as descriptive of sunken property in which someone
other than the last owner or possessor at the time of the mishap can
obtain a possessory or titular interest. A "derelict" is merely an
article of marine property, frequently but not necessarily a vessel,
that is not in the possession or control of its owner or someone acting
on the owner's behalf. An object which is res derelicta is not res
nullius or subject to a claim of ownership by its first possessor. The
original owner retains title while the salvor of the derelict obtains,
at most, a salvage lien in admiralty. "Abandoned" property refers
1. From approximately 1500 to 1800, Spain, to take a primary example, contributed
heavily to the archaeological debris on the North American Gulf and Atlantic continental
shelf. Pirates, primitive navigation, and unpredictable storms along La Carrera de Indias,
took an enormous toll of the convoys that would marshall in Havana harbor for the treacher-
ous first leg of the voyage, through the Florida Straights to Seville. See, J. PARRY, THE SPANISH
SEABORNE EMPIRE 118-22, 135, 254 (1966); S. POTTER, THE TREASURE DIVER'S GUIDE, at xix-xx
(1972).
2. 408 F. Supp. 907 (S.D. Fla. 1976), aff d., No. 76-2151 (5th Cir. Mar. 13, 1978).
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to all other marine property in which the loss or relinquishment of
physical possession necessary to render property derelict has merged
with an intent permanently to relinquish possession and title. Prop-
erty so abandoned is both possessorless and ownerless and is subject
to a claim of ownership by its finder or salvor.' Because some cases
interchangeably refer to an "abandonment" of possession as an
"abandonment" of title, and inconsistently use the term "derelict"
as synonymous with each, confusion will be avoided and consistency
with majority usage obtained if maritime property that has suffered
something less than complete relinquishment of possession and title
is called "derelict" rather than "abandoned." '4
Salvors under traditional admiralty principles obtain a lien
against the property they recover which enables them, in the case
of derelicts, to proceed either in rem against the property or in
personam against its owner, and solely in rem when the recovered
property is abandoned. A salvor's lien against derelict property re-
sults only in lien satisfaction while a lien against abandoned prop-
erty frequently results in outright ownership.'
Marine property becomes derelict when it reasonably appears
to be abandoned. Determining the point at which derelict property
becomes abandoned is a more difficult problem in the absence of an
express relinquishment of title and interest by the last owner or
occupier. It is clear that mere passage of time is insufficient, stand-
ing alone, to prove abandonment.' Nonuse over an extended period
of time, however, particularly when coupled with other facts and
circumstances, may be the basis for inferring an intent to abandon.
The inquiry in each case is essentially a factual one.'
If abandonment is to be defined as a voluntary and intentional
3. The Island City, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 121, 128 (1861); Eads v. Brazelton, 22 Ark. 499,
510 (1961); Merrill v. Fisher, 204 Mass. 600, 91 N.E. 132 (1910); Morris v. Lyonesse Salvage
Co., Ltd., [1970] 2 Lloyd's List L.R. 59, 60; The Tubantia, 18 Lloyd's List L.R. 158, 159-60
(1924). But see Simon v. Taylor, [1975] 2 Lloyd's List L.R. 338, 342-43. But cf. Bryan's Case,
6 Ct. Cl. 128, 134-35 (1870) (suggesting that even a salvage lien may be denied where the
salvor should reasonably have known that the property was not abandoned). See also, M.
NORRIs, THE LAW OF SALVAGE § 157 at 257-58 (1958).
4. See, e.g., The Island City, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 121, 128 (1861); The Port Hunter, 6 F.
Supp. 1009, 1011 (D. Mass. 1934); Thompson v. United States, 62 Ct. Cl. 516, 524 (1926);
Howard v. Sharlin, 61 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 1952); Merrill v. Fisher, 204 Mass. 600, 91 N.E. 132
(1910); 1 C.J.S. Abandonment §§ 3, 4. But see M. NORRIS, supra note 3, at 258. See generally
Korthols-Altes, Submarine Antiquities: A Legal Labyrinth, 4 SYRACUSE J. OF INT'L LAW &
COM. 77, 84-85 (1976).
5. See The Sabine, 101 U.S. 384, 386 (1879).
6. Wiggins v. 1100 Tons, More or Less, of Italian Marble, 186 F. Supp. 452, 456 (E.D.
Va. 1960); 1 C.J.S. Abandonment § 3 (b)(2).
7. Wiggins v. 1100 Tons, More or Less, of Italian Marble, 186 F. Supp. 452, 456 (E.D.
Va. 1960).
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relinquishment without hope of recovery or intention to return, 8 it
is difficult to regard the loss of a vessel with all hands, as might'
frequently have happened in the days of the Spanish treasure fleets,
without more, as an abandonment. Those crew members who are
lost to the weather, disease or enemy action, with the resultant loss
of their vessel, can hardly be said to have abandoned their vessel.,
Reasonable men, and certainly colonial governments, divine mon-
archs and avaricious conquistadores, do not voluntarily abandon
their valuables.
The intuitive notion that most rational persons do not abandon
their valuables is confirmed in the history of the Atocha which in
1622 went down with heavy loss of life in a storm off the coast of
Florida. The Spanish made repeated attempts to salvage what they
could from the A tocha and her sister ships until atorms carried away
their marker buoys, and shifting sands covered the wreck and its
cargo. Under these circumstances, proofs of formal abandonment by
the Spanish are highly circumstantial at best.'" Nor can abandon-
ment be presumed merely from a succession of Spanish govern-
ments, particularly if the vessel or cargo belonged to an agency of a
former government and there has never been an express or official
abandonment."
In addition to drawing inferences of abandonment from pro-
longed inaction, admiralty has attempted a partial solution of the
abandonment problem by providing a means for all known claim-
ants of the salvaged property to be noticed and heard. If no one
other than the salvor appears, abandonment may be presumed and
an inquiry into the recondite mental states of master, crew owner
and country of registry avoided. 2 If there are competing claimants,
as there probably will be where the salvaged vessel or cargo is of
recent vintage, an inquiry into who harbored what intent and when,
8. The Island City, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 121 (1861).
9. Cf. Bradley v. H. Newsom, Sons & Co., [1919] A.C. 16, 25, 27, where several judges
drew distinctions between the legal consequences of involuntary acts of physical abandon-
ment (for example, the crew dying on board of disease or being forced off the ship at gunpoint)
and voluntary acts (such as the crew abandoning ship to save their lives but harboring an
intent to return with aid). Some opinions suggested that third party salvage rights could only
arise in the latter situation. The notion that one can intentionally and temporarily physically
abandon marine property in an objectively imperiled state, but still avoid a salvage claim
by a third party salvor, seems to have little if any vitality left. The majority rule may be
found, for example, in the Island City, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 121, 128 (1861); The Coromandel,
166 Eng. Rep. 1097, 1099 (1857).
10. S. PoT'tER, supra note 1, at 215-18; R. MARX, THE UNDERWATER DIG 97 (1975); 149
NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC 787, 800-01 (1976).
11. Simon v. Taylor, [19751 2 Lloyd's List L.R. 338, 343.
12. See M. 0. Medina v. One Nylon Purse Seine, 259 F. Supp. 769, 771 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
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and who manifested what intent to possess or abandon, will be
unavoidable. Naturally, with admiralty's emphasis on active exploi-
tation, the longer marine property has lain undisturbed the more
suspect will be a putative owner's claim and proofs of possession.
While the cases do not explore this aspect of abandonment,
there undoubtedly is a belief extant in admiralty that after a certain
point in time owners of vessels and cargoes and their private or
governmental successors in interest need not even be noticed of an
antiquities salvage proceeding. As will be shown later in this article,
the risk of irretrievable loss of cultural artifacts will be heightened
if admiralty adheres to this belief. It is precisely through its power
to notice all potential claimants to a marine res that admiralty can
display a greater cultural awareness than it has previously done.
Rather than catalogue cases in which abandonment has been
found, it would be more relevant to examine what a finder or salvor
must do to secure a possessory or titular interest in sunken property.
One approach has been to determine whether the salvor or finder
treated the sunken property as a "purchaser would prudently have
done," and exercised only that "use and occupation of which the
subject matter was capable. ' 13 Under this view the salvor must
manifest an intent to reduce the property to physical possession by
dealing with the wreck as a whole in a way that would tend to warn,
if not exclude, subsequent salvors."
Most courts have required the presence of an intent to possess,
and although not insisting on physical possession, do seem to de-
mand an actively exploitative approach by the would-be salvor. 5
Thus, merely marking trees for range lines on each side of a river
and fixing buoys to the wreck was found indicative only of a desire
to reduce the wreck to possession, but not the attainment of posses-
sion. In the absence of such unambiguous manifestations of exclu-
sivity as placing a boat over the wreck site, actually salvaging some
cargo, or otherwise guarding the property, no salvage lien would be
recognized nor would title be obtained. 6 Even boarding a vessel and
publishing a notice of exclusive possession will not serve to mature
a claim to abandoned property unless "coupled with a then present
intention of conducting salvage operations."' 7 Intent and acts sym-
13. The Tubantia, 18 Lloyd's List L.R. 158, 160 (1924).
14. Id. See Morris v. Lyonesse Salvage Co., Ltd., [1970] 2 Lloyd's List L.R. 59, 60-61.
15. See, e.g., The Burlington, 73 F. 258, 264 (E.D. Mich. 1896); Brady v. The Steamship
African Queen, 179 F. Supp. 321, 324 (E.D. Va. 1960); The John Wurts, 13 F. Cas. 903, 905
(S.D.N.Y. 1847) (No. 7,434); Eads v. Brazelton, 22 Ark. 499, 510 (1861).
16. Eads v. Brazelton, 22 Ark. 499, 511-12 (1961).
17. Brady v. The Steamship African Queen, 179 F. Supp. 321, 324 (E.D. Va. 1960).
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bolic thereof must immediately be followed by "activity in the form
of constructive steps to aid the distressed property."'"
The cases suggest that a higher degree of constructive or sym-
bolic possession will be tolerated to establish possessory or titular
rights where the wrecks lie in extremely deep water or other particu-
larly inaccessible marine environments." In each case, an inquiry as
to the salvor's state of mind and the adequacy of his efforts will be
made and compared to what a reasonable and efficient owner of the
abandoned property in question would have done to protect and
recover his belongings. The important point is that the closer a
salvor gets to physical possession, the more secure his claim. The
more a salvage claim rests merely on fiat or pronouncement, the
greater the rights of subsequent salvors and the less inclined a court
will be to enjoin subsequent salvage efforts.
B. Sunken Property and Federal Salvage Law
The emphasis on active exploitation that was perceived to exist
in decisions discussing dereliction and abandonment is reflected in
the criteria that courts will follow in assessing noncontractual, or
"pure", salvage awards against derelict property. As generally de-
ified,
Salvage is the compensation allowed to persons by whose assis-
tance a ship or her cargo has been saved, in whole or in part, from
impending peril on the sea, or in recovering such property from
actual loss, as in cases of shipwreck, derelict, or recapture."0
Salvors of derelict property are entitled to an award in salvage based
on certain traditional criteria: labor expended, promptitude, skill
and energy used, the value of the equipment employed in the sal-
vage operation, the degree of danger to which the equipment was
exposed, the personal risk incurred, the value of the property
saved, and the degree of danger to which the property was ex-
posed.2
The significant distinction between pure salvage awards and all
other money judgments for rendition of beneficial services including
contractual salvage awards, is that the former are not awarded on
a quantum meruit basis. Rather, their essence lies in the public
policy of encouraging voluntary aid to property in maritime distress
18. Id.
19. See Morris v. Lyonesse Salvage Co., Ltd., [1970] 2 Lloyd's List L.R. 59, 62; The
Tubantia, 18 Lloyd's List L.R. 158, 160 (1924).
20. The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1, 12 (1869).
21. Id. at 14.
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by bestowing on the successful salvor admiralty's largesse, albeit
from the pocket of the owner of the salvaged property."
In contractual salvage the situation is slightly different. While
both contract and pure salvage generate salvage liens, the measure
of a contract salvage lien usually is to be derived from the terms of
the contract and not from traditional admiralty criteria for salvage
awards. 3 Admiralty clearly prefers to apply its own rules, however,
and not the intentions of the parties, unless contractual intent is
unambiguous.2 4 Thus, if contract terms or circumstances can be
construed in such a way that the "salvor's right to receive a merito-
rious award" rather than the contractual amount will be protected,
they generally will be so construed.25
In the salvage contract the parties may also dispense with oth-
erwise applicable admiralty salvage principles by eliminating suc-
cess as a condition of salvage recovery or so drafting the contractual
terms governing actual field performance that the definitional re-
quirement of impending peril is virtually eliminated. Because con-
tract salvage of this type is neither rendered gratuitously nor depen-
dent on the subsequent beneficence of admiralty, it is at the border-
line of admiralty jurisdiction. Contractual recovery of marine anti-
quities, as provided for in most state antiquity statutes, similarly
pushes admiralty jurisdiction to its applicable limits. Although
there may be a basis for arguing that antiquities salvage is not a
traditional maritime activity,6 and however attenuated their other
similarities to salvage principles may be, most state antiquity stat-
utes do proceed on a success or "no cure, no pay" footing. For
purposes of the present discussion the success term in state antiq-
uity salvage contracts provides a sufficient nexus to matters over
which admiralty has traditionally asserted a salvage jurisdiction.
In the case of sunken, abandoned or derelict marine property
of no cultural interest, the concept of impending peril has already
been modified in both pure and contract salvage situations to meet
the demands of public policy and the realities of maritime practice.
Once property is on the bottom, time is rarely of the essence and
22. Id. Accord, The Sabine, 101 U.S. 384, 389 (1879).
23. See The Elfrida, 172 U.S. 186, 192 (1898); Veverica v. Drill Barge Buccaneer No. 7,
488 F.2d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 1974).
24. "Nothing short of a distinct agreement to pay the stipulated sum, whether the service
be successful or not, will change the character of a salvage contract of employment, or deprive
it of its maritime lien." Chapman v. The Engines of the Greenpoint, 38 F. 671 (S.D.N.Y.
1889). See The Excelsior, 123 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1887); The Camanche, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 448,
477 (1869).
25. Cf. Atlantic Towing Co. v. The Caliche, 47 F. Supp. 610, 614 (S.D. Ga. 1942).
26. See note 136 infra.
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salvage can be conducted on a nonemergency basis. Because the
oceans are a vast and opaque medium, the opportunities for extra-
judicial appropriation of property by finders and salvors are enor-
mous. Even where work and risk are "trifling", admiralty has tradi-
tionally rewarded the secret finders of abandoned property liberally,
both as remuneration for their self-denial and as a plea to other
serendipitous and intentional finders to place their trust in admi-
ralty's generosity. 7 "Impending peril" in these situations, has been
functionally redefined to mean merely the increasing likelihood of
permanent loss that attends marine property the longer it remains
unsalvaged. 2s
As a result of these principles-namely admiralty's high regard
for salvors and its belief in the efficacy of generous remuneration as
insurance against both undetectable acts of dishonesty and one
mariner's indifference to another's peril-awards in derelict and
abandonment situations have been high. When the recovered prop-
erty has been found to be abandoned, its finder is traditionally
entitled to its exlusive ownership and possession. 9 Substantially the
same result obtains when the property is merely derelict, if it is of
a minimal value far exceeded by the value of the salvor's work and
expenditures. 0 In all other derelict salvage cases, admiralty rarely
awards less than a third of the value of the salvaged property, gener-
ally awards a moiety (or one half of its value) and occasionally
awards more.'
C. The Salvor and the State
The general rule applicable to abandoned marine property is
27. Broere v. Two Thousand One Hundred Thirty Three Dollars, 72 F. Supp. 115-18
(E.D.N.Y. 1947); Rowe v. The Brig, 20 F. Cas. 1281, 1283 (D. Mass. 1919) (No. 12,093).
28. Gardner v. Ninety-nine Gold Coins, 111 F. 552, 553 (D. Mass. 1899).
29. See notes 3-5 supra, and accompanying text. See also Richard v. Pringle, 293 F.
Supp. 981, 985 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); M.O. Medina v. One Nylon Purse Seine, 259 F. Supp. 769,
771 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
30. The Burlington, 73 F. 258, 264-65 (E.D. Mich. 1896). See also Llewellyn v. Two
Anchors and Chains, 15 F. Cas. 711 (E.D.N.Y. 1866) (No. 8,428); The Zealand, 30 F. Cas.
917 (D. Mass. 1865) (No. 18,205).
31. The Brewster, 4 F. Cas. 82 (S.D. Fla. 1848) (No. 1,852); The John Wurts, 13 F. Cas.
903, 905 (S.D.N.Y. 1847) (No. 7,434) (a "moiety"); Rowe v. The Brig, 20 F. Cas. 1281, 1283
(D. Mass. 1818) (No. 12,093) (a "moiety"). See also the catalogue of salvage award of fifty
percent and over, collected in The Lamington, 86 F. 675, 685-89 (2d Cir. 1898). But see Post
v. Jones, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 150, 161 (1856); "[N]o valid reason can be assigned for fixing a
reward for salving derelict property at a moiety or any given proportion ... the true principle
is adequate award, according to the circumstances of the case." Moiety as a maximum applies
only to those situations in which the owner of the salvaged property appears. Other criteria
for awards of more than a moiety are enumerated in K. MCGUFFIE, KENNEDY'S CIVIL SALVAGE
162-64 (4th ed. 1958).
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that a government may proclaim itself owner of abandoned property
within its jurisdiction, but without a clear legislative statement to
this effect, the courts should adhere to traditional maritime law
principles of finder and salvor."
With the possible exception of Platoro Ltd., Inc. v. Unidentified
Remains of a Vessel,33 Ervin v. The Massachusetts Co.,34 and Wade
v. Flying "W" Enterprises, Inc.," there is no significant contempo-
rary body of case law which holds that the government's title to
abandoned marine property is an inherent prerogative of its sover-
eignty. The Massachusetts Co. case has been uniformly condemned
by all commentators.3 Plying "W" Enterprises, while citing
Maddachusetts Co. approvingly in support of its finding of sovereign
prerogative, could have reached the same result by relying on tradi-
tional salvage principles. In Flying "W" Enterprises, North Caro-
lina, commencing in March, 1962, had attempted to salvage cargoes
from sunken Confederate blockade runners. Since the trespassory
acts the state sought to enjoin occurred in 1965, the state could have
been adequately protected as a first finder or salvor, without reli-
ance on questionable precedent. Platoro, while rearticulating
Massachusetts Co.'s disingenuous common-law rule of sovereign
prerogative over "wrecks of the sea", and thus perpetuating
Massachusetts Co. 's misanalysis, does eventually arrive at a sub-
stantively correct result.
The suggestion in Massachusetts Co., Flying "W" Enterprises,
and Platoro, that ownership of sunken property if not claimed
within a reasonable period of time is in the state and not the salvor
32. United States v. Tyndale, 116 F. 820, 823 (1st Cir. 1902); Murphy v. Dunham, 38 F.
503, 509-10 (E.D. Mich. 1889); Russell v. Forty Bales of Cotton, 21 F. Cas. 42, 48-50 (S.D.
Fla. 1872) (No. 12,154); Thompson v. United States, 62 Ct. Cl. 516, 524 (1926).
33. 371 F. Supp. 356 (S.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 508 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir.
1975).
34. 95 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1957).
35. 273 N.C. 399, 160 S.E. 2d 482 (1968).
36. In The Massachusetts Co., the court concluded that the hulk of a former U.S. war-
ship, scuttled in territorial waters in 1922, was "wreck" according to English case and statu-
tory law. Since by statute the common law was still in force in Florida unless repealed or
inconsistent with subsequent law, English precedent vested title to a "wreck" in the sovereign
after a year and a day. The case has been citicized for: (1) misconstruing the pivotal concept
of "wreck", which is property washed ashore but does not include property submerged consid-
erably offshore, as the warship was here; (2) for disingenuously using only those few English
precedents which were consistent with its hypothesis, and ignoring American case law to the
contrary; (3) for generally ignoring the fact that some of the precedents relied upon post-dated
July 4, 1776, the cut-off date of Florida's common law savings statute; and (4) for applying
the wrong group of Florida abandoned property statutes. See Kenny & Hornsoff, The Owner-
ship of the Treasures of the Sea, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 383 (1967-68); Note, 12 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 97 (1970-71); Note, 21 U. FLA. L. REV. 360 (1969). See also Treasure Salvors, Inc. v.
The Unidentified Vessel, No. 76-2151 (5th Cir. Mar. 13, 1978).
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or finder, is not supported elsewhere in the case law. In United
States v. Tyndale,37 the court stated that it was not within the
province of the courts to determine that "royal prerogatives" in the
products of marine catastrophy, which were relied upon in England
as a source of royal revenues, apply to an executive department
funded by the U.S. Treasury. In Murphy v. Dunham,3" the court
stated that sunken property was sui generis. It was neither wreck
because it was not washed ashore; nor flotsam, because it did not
float upon the water; nor jetsam, because it had never been jetti-
soned; nor ligan, because it had not been buoyed. Since only objects
in these categories accrued to the Crown, sunken property could
never go to the state except by specific statute. Russell v. Forty
Bales of Cotton 9 traced the Crown's historic interest in maritime
property not to revenues but to its humane motivation of interced-
ing on behalf of ghipwrecked porgong against the barbaric praeticeg
to which they were subjected by certain British coastal inhabitants.
The idea that the Crown had an abstract revenue prerogative was
not "sufficiently definite, regular, and certain to establish a princi-
ple of national law," at least in the United States.
Largely in response to the uncertainties that surrounded their
title to sunken property in the absence of statute, many states have
attempted to protect their marine antiquities legislatively. The
Florida Archives and History Act4" and its implementing regula-
tions4' apply to "artifacts, treasure trove, and objects of antiquity
which have . . . historical value or are of interest to the public,
including. . . sunken or abandoned ships . "..."I' The Act further
provides that title to such objects on "state-owned sovereignty sub-
merged lands" is vested in the state.43 All underwater exploration
and excavation must be done by qualified salvors pursuant to a
permit." The permit is issued after a contract is negotiated between
the state and the salvor. 5 The Act also provides for on-site supervi-
37. 116 F. 820, 823 (1st Cir. 1902).
38. 38 F. 503, 509-10 (E.D. Mich. 1889).
39. 21 F. Cas. 42, 48-50 (S.D. Fla. 1872) (No. 12,154).
40. FLA. STAT. §§ 267.011-.14 (1975).
41. FLA. AD. REG. 1A-31.01-.12 (1975).
42. FLA. STAT. § 267.061(1)(a) (1975). FLA. AD. REG. 1A-31.02 (1975) purports to apply
the Law to "All Articles of Ancient, historic or intrinsic value."
43. FLA. STAT. §§ 267.061(1)(b), .12(3) (1975). FLA. AD. REG. 1A-31.09 (1975) vests Flor-
ida with title to the same class of objects "Recovered in the Waters of the State of Florida."
This would seem to be a broader jurisdictional grant than the statute contains. Cf. FLA. STAT.
§ 253.12 (1975) (vesting title to submerged lands in the state).
44. FLA. STAT. § 267.12'(1975).
45. FLA. STAT. § 267.031(5) (1975); FLA. AD. REG. 1A-31.03, .07, .08 (1975).
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sion by state employees, record keeping, reporting and criminal
penalties for violation."
While Florida's Act is more detailed than many, it contains
several notable omissions. It applies on its face to objects which
have intrinsic value, but are not necessarily antiquities, and to arti-
cles which are historic, but not necessarily old.47 The Act provides
no criteria for salvor remuneration, merely stating that whatever is
salvaged is to be divided pursuant to the contract." Neither the Act
nor the regulations provide definite guidance on what can and can-
not be included in the contract.
Georgia's statute, by comparison, provides that "archaeologi-
cally significant objects" remain the property of the State. It
extends its protection to "ancient and abandoned ships and other
similar sites and objects," and provides for a "reasonable finders'
fee" for the salvor.4" South Carolina's statute creates a property
right in the State for "all shipwrecks, sunken vessels and all things
therein, including . ..cargoes, tackle" and other artifacts and
things of value "which have remained unclaimed for more than fifty
years . . . ." Alternative provisions for salvor remuneration include
"fair compensation," and, with the approval of the state, retention
by the salvor of all or a portion of the relics or artifacts recovered.5
North Carolina's statute is substantially similar to South Caro-
lina's." Texas extends its marine antiquities jurisdiction to "pre-
twentieth century ships" and cargoes that are "sunken or aban-
doned."52 Massachusetts' scheme also protects vessels and cargoes,
if they are of historical value and have either been unclaimed for
more than 100 years or are valued in excess of $5,000.53 Massachu-
setts allows its permittee-salvors to retain 75% of the value of the
material recovered,54 while Texas allows a fair compensation to the
46. FLA. STAT. § 267.13 (1975); FLA. AD. REG. 1A-31.10 to .12 (1975).
47. See FLA. STAT. § 267.061(1)(a)-(b) (1975).
48. See FLA. AD. REG. 1A-31.09 (1975). The predecessor to the present Archives and
History Act, the Antiquities Act of 1965, FLA. STAT. §§ 267.01 - .08 (1965), did provide for a
75-25 percent division in favor of the salvor. It has been reported that, at least as of 1969,
salvage contracts negotiated by the Florida Board of Archives and History still retain the 75-
25 percent division. 21 U. FLA. L. REV., supra note 36, at 374 n.104. Use of the 75-25 salvage
split, and even an 87 1l2-12 1.2 division when the salvor was a county historical society,
antedate the 1965 and 1967 laws. MINUTES OF THE TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT
FUND,'STATE OF FLORIDA, VOL. XXXIII at 176 (January 17, 1961), 192 (February 7, 1961).
49. GA. CODE ANN. § 40:813a (1975).
50. S.C. CODE §§ 54-7-210 to -280(Supp. 1976).
51. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 121-22 to -28 (1974).
52. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6145-9, § 2 (Vernon 1970).
53. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 6, § 180 (West 1976).
54. Id. ch. 91, § 63 (West Supp. 1977).
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salvager in terms of either a percentage of the reasonable cash value
of the objects recovered or a fair share of the objects themselves."
Virtually all statutes provide for public access or museum display
of the state's share. It seems certain that an analysis of the antiqui-
ties statutes of other coastal, lacustrine or riverine states would
reveal a similar array of legislative approaches.5"
As of the present, no reported cases have been found interpret-
ing state marine antiquities statutes. However, in an analogous sta-
tutory area, namely, the states's parens patriae interest in ship-
wrecked articles and persons, a significant, and possibly portentous
case appears. Wiggins v. 1100 Tons, More or Less, of Italian
Marble,57 construed a 1792 Virginia law which created the office of
County Wreck Commissioner and vested in the Commissioner the
power to take possession of wrecked property for the purposes of
assistance and preservation. The Commissioner granted salvage
rights to the claimants to remove marble from a vessel which had
gone down off the county coast sixty-five years earlier, on the condi-
tion that the salvors remit a percentage of the value of the salvaged
material to the county. In a subsequent dispute over the nature of
the rights, if any, that the Wreck Commissioner purported to grant,
the court first disposed of the county's argument that the state
statute vested the Commissioner with exclusive possessory rights to
all abandoned marine property and wrecks. It noted that in sixty-
five years the Office of the Wreck Commissioner had never invento-
ried the vessel, hired guards or laborers, reduced the vessel to pos-
session in any way, or treated it as unavailable for public salvage.
As to the Commissioner's power to grant salvage rights under these
circumstances, the court stated:
The statute gives no authority to the Wreck Commissioner to
grant exclusive salvage rights. Indeed, it is extremely doubtful
that any such statute could be constitutionally enacted. Cer-
tainly it is true that after 65 years, with no action ever having
been taken by the Commissioner of Wrecks, his authority to grant
such an exclusive right is no greater than that of any individual."
Although not directly passing upon the constitutionality of the
1792 statute, the court nevertheless voiced serious doubt that such
a statute would be constitutional:
55. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6145-9, § 9 (Vernon 1970).
56. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 41.35.010 - .240, (1962); CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 24-80-401 to
-409 (1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 701 - 791 (Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CoDE ANN. §§
27.53.010 - .090 (Supp. 1976).
57. 186 F. Supp. 452 (E.D. Va. 1960):
58. Id. at 455.
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We do not reach the serious constitutional question as to the right
of a state to lay claim to wrecked property, as opposed to the
policy of maritime law encouraging the recovery of distressed
property by holding out the right to be liberally rewarded. An
analysis of the Wreck Commissioner statutes does not lead to the
belief that the Wreck Commissioner is legally placed in posses-
sion of all wrecks and their contents by operation of law.5 9
The remainder of this paper will explore the accuracy of the
opinion expressed in Wiggins, that state antiquities laws may not
effectively vest title to sunken artifacts in the state, by analyzing
the conflict, if any, between state and federal law in this area.
III. STATE JURISDICTION OVER MARITIME PROPERTY UNDER THE SAV-
ING TO SUITORS CLAUSE
Article III, section 2(1) of the United States Constitution ex-
tends the judicial power of the United States to all cases of admi-
ralty and maritime jurisdiction. The Judiciary Act of 1789 vests
federal district courts with exclusive jurisdiction over all civil cases
of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction "saving to suitors in all cases
all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled."6' The pres-
ence of state jurisdiction in admiralty and maritime matters is thus
dependent on the availability of a remedy under the savings to
suitors clause.
The issue, therefore, is whether states have a concurrent pros-
criptive salvage jurisdiction with the federal courts and Congress
and, if they do not, one must ask what is the limit of their jurisdic-
tion over marine property. In delimiting state jurisdiction in this
area, the decisions ask one or both of the following questions: is the
state remedy to be applied essentially one in rem or in personam,
and is the remedy based on common law contract principles or
admiralty salvage rules.
Considering the second criterion first, many courts have said
that a state court has jurisdiction only where a contract for services
59. !d. See also M. NORRIS, supra note 3, § 157 at 258 which similarly noted:
The State's claim of ownership conflicts with the claims of a salvor in the respect
that it may decrease the amount of his reward by reason of the state's claim. The
state's claim can thorefore be said to conflict with the policy of the maritime law
of encouraging the recovery of distressed property by holding out the right to be
liberally rewarded, and may raise a constitutional question.
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1970). Before the 1948 revision, what was saved to suitors was
"the right of a common-law remedy where the common law is competent to give it." The
amendment has been construed as in no way narrowing the jurisdiction of the state. Madruga
v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556, 560 n.12 (1953).
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is made." In such cases, the right of recovery depends upon whether
the services were rendered pursuant to the contract, and not upon
the success or failure of the salvage attempt. 2 This is, of course, no
more than a recognition by the courts that common law contract
principles are within the scope of the savings to suitors clause. It is
noteworthy that beyond stating this simple truth, the cases have not
attempted to fashion or discern a logical basis for their rejection of
concurrent state salvage jurisdiction. 3 One case, Sturgis v. Law &
St. John,4 stands as an exception. In Sturgis, the court was asked
to reduce the amount of a state referee's award to a salvor. It was
contended that the award had been computed using admiralty sal-
vage rules rather than those principles governing common law re-
covery in quantum meruit. Predicated on the saving to suitors
clause, " Sturgis had no difficulty in concluding, as a matter of law,
that state salvage jurisdiction was fully concurrent with the salvage
jurisdiction of admiralty; however, practical reasons militated
against a state's insistence on exercising its concurrent jurisdiction.
Primarily, Sturgis' holding was based on the court's belief that the
expertise required to discern and apply the complex of factors com-
prising a salvage award was beyond the competence of state com-
mon law courts and lay juries. The court also stated that the vir-
tually total absence of precedent for state common law jurisdiction
over the subject militates against concurrency in salvage. Sturgis'
61. See Reynolds v. Browning Wells & Co., 224 App. Div. 442, 443, 231 N.Y.S. 362, 364,
(1928) in which the court stated: "The contract being one for services and the price being
agreed upon, the state court has jurisdiction of the action, although it would not have jurisdic-
tion if the action were one to recover salvage without any express contract in relation thereto."
Accord, Merritt & Chapman Derrick & Wrecking Co. v. Tice, 77 App. Div. 326, 79 N.Y.S.
120 (1902). See also The Cheeseman v. Two Ferryboats, 5 F. Cas. 528 (S.D. Ohio 1870) (No.
2,633).
62. See cases cited in note 62 supra.
63. See generally Houseman v. The Schooner North Carolina, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 40, 48
(1841), in which the court questioned rhetorically: "What other court, but a court of admi-
ralty, has jurisdiction to try a question of salvage?" See also M. NORRIS, supra note 3, § 14
at 18:
Cases of salvage were not tried in American common-law courts before the estab-
lishment of the Republic of the United States of America. Therefore, the savings
to suitors clause of the Act of September 24, 1789 ... does not apply to salvage
suits. It does not give the common-law courts jurisdiction over a class of cases
which it never possessed.
64. 5 Super. Ct. 451 (N.Y. 1850); accord, O'Neill v. Schoenbrod, No. 77-1922 (Fla. 3d
D.C.A. Feb. 7, 1978).
65. Sturgis did not, in so many words, mention the saving to suitors clause. However,
the language in Sturgis quite clearly alluded to the clause:
Strange as it may seem, there is no instance which we are aware of, where the question
has been raised, whether a court of common law has jurisdiction to award a salvage compen-
sation. It is generally supposed that courts of common law have concurrent jurisdiction, in
cases of salvage, as they have in many other cases with courts of admiralty.
6 Super. Ct. at 456.
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ultimate rejection of jurisdictional concurrency was clearly based
not on an apprehension of legal disability or federal supremacy but
on pragmatic considerations. Far from denying state court jurisdic-
tion over salvage matters, Sturgis, after concluding that a state
court should desist from rendering salvage awards, proceeded to
award an amount admittedly in excess of quantum meruit.
The conclusions to be drawn from Sturgis are somewhat uncer-
tain. Perhaps all that may safely be derived from this case is that
the only court to consider the matter at any length found no legal
impediment to concurrent state salvage jurisdiction." What might,
as a practical matter, preclude state jurisdiction was not the pres-
ence or absence of the success requirement or common law contract
principles, but an esoteric body of nautical knowledge and admi-
ralty procedure which was unfamiliar to the common law. There
have been no subsequent cases discussing the problem that con-
cerned Sturgis. While Sturgis, so interpreted, remains good law, it
is on the distinction between in rem and in personam actions that
later cases have relied in assessing the contemporary scope of state
jurisdiction over maritime property generally and marine salvage in
particular.
Prompted for the most part by the profusion of state lien laws
that allowed creditors of maritime property to proceed in rem
against the vessel and its appurtenances, the United States Su-
preme Court in The Moses Taylor"8 and The Hine v. Trevor 9 at-
tempted to define the limits of federal and state jurisdiction over
maritime property. The underlying subject matter of each in rem
66. Id. at 462.
67. Despite Sturgis' pragmatic rejection of state salvage jurisdiction, there is little indi-
cation that the states have been uniformly deterred from claiming a salvage competence for
themselves. Several states retain statutes that to all outward appearances assert both in rem
and in personam jurisdiction over derelict and abandoned vessels and cargoes. See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 705.01-.16, 706.20, 707.13-.14 (West 1969 & Supp. 1973); DEL. CODE tit. 23, §
1304 (1974). The Delaware Code provides, in part:
The finder of a wrecked and abandoned vessel or goods and all persons rendering
aid in saving or securing such vessel or goods, or in saving a vessel from wreck,
shall be paid such reasonable salvage as may be agreed on or as shall be assessed
by 3 judicious men, to be appointed by a Judge of the Superior Court. The sums
awarded shall be a lien on such vessel or goods and upon the fund raised by any
sale thereof ....
It is open to some doubt whether salvage statutes such as Delaware's are permissible variants
of actions in trover (Sturgis v. Law & St. John, 5 Super. Ct. 451 (N.Y. 1850)), or replevin
(Mengel Box Co. v. Joest, 137 Miss. 461, 90 So. 161 (1921); Merrill v. Fisher, 204 Mass. 600,
91 N.E. 132 (1910)), or are simply unabashed assertions of a concurrent salvage jurisdiction.
See Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U.S. 638, 642-43 (1899).
68. 71 U.S. 441 (1866).
69. 71 U.S. 555 (1866).
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action (marine passenger carriage in The Moses Taylor, and colli-
sion on internal navigable waters in The Hine v. Trevor) was clearly
maritime and traditionally cognizable in admiralty. Both cases
noted that state lien laws as written, construed and enforced within
their jurisdiction, invested the state courts with jurisdiction identi-
cal to that possessed by federal admiralty courts. The Court decided
that the statutes creating state liens were not permissibly predi-
cated, pursuant to the mandate of the saving to suitors clause, on
any enabling common law principles:
The case before us is not within the saving clause of the ninth
section [of the Judiciary Act of 1789]. That clause only saves to
suitors 'the right of a common-law remedy, where the common
law is competent to give it.' It is not a remedy in the common-
law courts which is saved, but a common-law remedy. A pro-
ceeding in rem, as used in the admiralty courts, is not a remedy
afforded by the common law; it is a proceeding under the civil
law. When used in the common-law courts, it is given by stat-
ute. 0
Thus, these cases hold that state in rem lien statutes affecting mari-
time property are preempted by an exclusive federal jurisdiction
and, furthermore, provide the basis for restricted state jurisdiction
over maritime property. Neither case, however, seriously questions
the existence of the large but undefined area in which the states
retain concurrent jurisdiction over maritime property under the sav-
ing to suitors clause.7' The problem of delimitation appeared at that
time to be, and to a large extent still is, resolvable by defining the
essential attributes of in rem remedies" and leaving unelucidated
the ambiguous term "common law remedy."73
70. The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. at 431. See The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S. at 571.
71. The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. at 428-30; The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S. at 571.
72. An action against a vessel, by name, as though it were the defendant in the matter,
followed by seizure, adjudication, judgment and sale of the vessel, is an in rem proceeding.
As employed traditionally in admiralty, and under then existing state practice, the sale of
the vessel following such an in rem action terminated all prior possessory and titular claims
against it, and passed clear title against both revealed and unrevealed interests. In a proceed-
ing of this sort, it was unnecessary to even notify the owners of the vessel of their legal
predicament. An in personam action, in contrast, allows maritime property to be reached by
attachment or lien but makes the in rem aspects of the action ancillary to, and dependent
upon, an underlying action against named defendants. Property so reached can also be sold;
however, what is obtained by a purchaser in an in personam action is not title good against
the world, but a title no better than that possessed by the last owner. E.g., The Moses Taylor,
71 U.S. 411 (1866); The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S. 555 (1866). See also Rounds v. Cloverport
Foundry & Machine Co., 237 U.S. 303 (1915); Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U.S.
638 (1899).
73. See, C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 148-49 (1943), where the Court noted
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Following The Moses Taylor and The Hine v. Trevor, the extent
of the state's jurisdictional grant under the saving to suitors clause
remained unclear. Those two cases merely defined the procedural
limits beyond which state actions could not go, at the risk of offend-
ing admiralty's exclusive in rem jurisdiction. Two questions re-
mained: Whether there was also an in personam subject matter
limitation on the states; and if there were admiralty and maritime
areas exclusively subject to federal jurisdiction (in rem or in
personam), whether there was nevertheless a regulatory niche in
these areas permitted to the states. The Hine v. Trevor had cursorily
addressed the last question and found no intent on the part of the
drafters of the saving to suitors clause to permit states to legislate
themselves into concurrency with any aspect of federal admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction. 4 In the context of that case, however,
dicta to this effect may well be limited to in rem proceedings.
In Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Trust Company, 5 the Court dis-
cussed the substantive as opposed to the procedural limitations of
the saving to suitors clause and concluded that a state statute vali-
dating a written contract to arbitrate could be enforced by the state
even though the arbitration clause was part of a clearly maritime
contract of charter. Although the remedy of arbitration was not a
"common law remedy," it neither modified existing substantive
maritime law nor displaced or altered traditional maritime reme-
dies. The Court's interpretation of the saving to suitors clause went
considerably beyond the demands of the solely in personam action
before it:
The 'right of a common law remedy', so saved to suitors, does not
• . . include attempted changes by the States in the substantive
admiralty law, but it does include all means other than proceed-
ings in admiralty which may be employed to enforce the right or
to redress the injury involved. It includes remedies in pais, as well
as proceedings in court; judicial remedies conferred by 'statute,
as well as those existing at the common law; remedies in equity,
as well as those enforceable in a court of law .... A State may
not provide a remedy in rem for any cause of action within the
admiralty jurisdiction . . . . But otherwise, the State, having
concurrent jurisdiction, is free to adopt such remedies and to
attach to them such incidents, as it sees fit."6
that what the framers had in mind when they used the phrase "common law remedy" has
never been clear.
74. 71 U.S. at 571-72.
75. 264 U.S. 109 (1924).
76. Id. at 123-25.
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Red Cross Line, rather than circumscribing the notion of a common
law remedy, expanded it to cover virtually every proceeding to en-
force a right or redress an injury without regard to its judicial or
legislative origin, as long as it did not interfere with existing mari-
time law and did not provide an in rem solution.
Red Cross Line's broad construction of the saving to suitors
clause was subsequently expanded in C. J Hendry Co. v. Moore."
In C. J. Hendry, state authorities seized and proceeded in rem
against a fishing net used in violation of state fishing laws. A state
statute had allowed equipment so used to be seized, forfeited after
hearing, and then sold or destroyed. Limiting the exclusivity of the
in rem remedy only to "suits between private persons," the Su-
preme Court concluded that the common law had always given an
in rem remedy in cases of forfeiture. Thus, under the saving to
suitors clause, "the states were left free to provide such a remedy
in forfeiture cases where the articles are seized upon navigable wa-
ters of the state for violation of state law.""8
A further extension of state jurisdiction over maritime property
under the saving to suitors clause occurred in Madruga v. Superior
Court." There, eight owners of 85% of a vessel and one owner of 15%
disagreed about the wisdom of selling their ship. In allowing state
concurrent jurisdiction over a partition action brought by the major-
ity owners, the court stated that admiralty's jurisdiction is exclusive
in a very specific type of in rem proceeding. It is not enough that
the subject matter of the proceeding is maritime property and that
the relief sought operates primarily to adjudicate rights in a marine
res. Rather, for federal exclusivity to operate, the suit must begin
and be carried on in rem. The property itself must be "treated as
the offender and made the defendant by name or description in
order to enforce a lien.""° Since the "quarrel" of the majority owners
was with their co-owner, not their ship, and the matter had pro-
ceeded below on an in personam basis, any judgment rendered
would only affect personal interests, not those of the world in the
res. 81
The problem is really no clearer after the definitional approach
to federal exclusivity attempted in Madruga. It is difficult to under-
stand, as the dissent in Madruga points out,82 why much of the
77. 318 U.S. 133 (1943).
78. Id. at 153.
79. 346 U.S. 556 (1953).
80. Id. at 560.
81. Id. at 561.
82. Id. at 564-67.
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preemptive thrust of the in rem doctrine cannot be vitiated by art-
fully captioning pleadings and drafting allegations to make the in
rem aspects of the action appear ancillary to those in personam.
Madruga's affirmation of state concurrency may be part of a general
retreat from Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen"3 in areas other than
personal injury. The problems of uniformity and choice of law will
be discussed further below.
Surveyed briefly, the saving to suitors clause now permits a
state to entertain in personam actions with in rem remedies, in rem
actions if forfeiture is sought, lien forclosures and actions to quiet
title,"4 in rem actions if they have not traditionally been considered
maritime, 5 possessory actions," and possibly in rem actions with in
personam remedies. The last category is tentatively included based
on the language in Madruga that a cause must be "begun and car-
ried on" in rem in order to qualify as in rem in admiralty usage. 7
Although there is no case law which specifically approves its exer-
cise of concurrent salvage jurisdiction, a state's general maritime
property jurisdiction under the saving to suitors clause is obviously
broad enough to include jurisdiction over marine antiquities.
The range of state control over maritime property permitted by
the saving to suitors clause does not only permit the extension of
state jurisdiction to marine antiquities, but suggests a variety of
procedural provisions that might be included in state antiquity stat-
utes. For example, contests over the terms and conditions of an
antiquities recovery and division of the material recovered could
nominally proceed in personam as possessory contests between state
and salvor with ancillary in rem process allowed by way of attach-
ment or execution. Most importantly, after Hendry there is no rea-
son why the recovered material itself could not be the subject of an
in rem forfeiture action if the salvors violated the terms of their
contract or the state antiquity law. Furthermore, the possibilities
for creatively employing possessory in personam remedies in state
antiquity statutes (in the replevin and trover tradition) are endless.
83. 244 U.S. 205 (1916).
84. Sellick v. Sun Harbor Marina, Inc., 384 F.2d 870, 871-2 (9th Cir. 1967) (lien for
wharfage).
85. Grow v. Steel Gas Screw Loraine K, 310 F.2d 547 (6th Cir. 1962) (lien for unpaid
ship insurance premium).
86. O.F. Shearer & Sons, Inc. v. Decker, 349 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D. W. Va. 1972); Merrill
v. Fisher, 204 Mass. 600, 91 N.E. 132 (1910) (replevin of derelict stolen vessel from its salvors);
Mengel Box Co. v. Joest, 137 Miss. 461, 90 So. 161 (1921) (replevin). See also The Tietjen &
Lang No. 2, 53 F. Supp. 459 (D.N.J. 1944).
87. Cf. Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U.S. 638 (1899) (discussing the possible
independence of remedy from its underlying action).
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Finally, it should be noted that state jurisdiction over marine
property is not derived soley from the saving to suitors clause but
possesses independent constitutional underpinnings. The state's
regulation of marine properties may derive legitimacy as well from
the state's police and eminent domain powers and from the state's
property rights in its submerged lands. Each of these powers is
traditionally concomitant with state sovereignty. State police power
has been exercised to preserve and regulate the use of valuable
resources necessary for the public welfare."8 The eminent domain
power has been held to reach personal property of historical interest
even if the property is already impressed with a public use. 9 The
virtually complete proprietorship possessed by the state in its sub-
merged lands may be asserted as a basis for the state's ownership
or regulation of artifacts contained in those lands. 0 These indepen-
dent bases for state antiquities regulation will be discussed further
below.
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL UNIFORMITY AS A LIMITATION ON
STATE JURISDICTION OVER MARINE PROPERTY
At times consequent and at others contrapuntal to the apparent
expansion of the scope of state jurisdiction over marine property
under the saving to suitors clause, there has been the sporadic devel-
opment of a uniform federal admiralty and maritime jurisdiction
over maritime torts and contracts. This section will trace briefly the
uncertain emergence of a federal rule of maritime uniformity
against which the constitutionality of state marine antiquities laws
can better be assessed.
While the debate over federal maritime uniformity antedates
Jensen, 1, that case is generally taken as the commencement of mod-
ern uniformity developments.2 In Jensen, the widow of a longshore-
man killed upon New York's navigable waters recovered a state
workmen's compensation award for her husband's death. The
88. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948); Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941); Geer
v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
The public welfare interest to be protected may be a cultural or an aesthetic one. See
E.B. Elliott Adv. Co. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 425 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 805 (1970); Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 50 App. Div. 2d
265, 377 N.Y.S. 2d 20 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
89. See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 408 F. Supp. 321, 355-56 n.49
(D.D.C. 1976).
90. See United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184, 188 (1975); Submerged Lands Act, 43
U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1970).
91. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
92. See, e.g., The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558 (1874).
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United States Supreme Court vacated the award and rejected the
attempt by New York to extend workmen's compensation coverage
to a subject traditionally within admiralty jurisdiction-injuries
upon navigable waters. Although this left Jensen's widow without
a statutory remedy since there was at that time no Longshoreman's
and Harbor Workers Compensation Act, the Court was unwilling to
risk endorsing a multiplicity of state compensation schemes in an
area left unregulated by the intentional inaction of Congress. The
Court admitted it was "difficult, if not impossible, to define with
exactness just how far the general maritime law may be changed,
modified, or affected by state legislation."93 Nevertheless, state leg-
islation would not be valid if it "contravenes the essential purpose
expressed by an act of Congress or works material prejudice to the
characteristic features of the general maritime law or interferes with
the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international
and interstate relations."'"
The holding in Jensen was quickly circumscribed. Western Fuel
Co. v. Garcia"5 created a "maritime but local" rule to cover situa-
tions in which an admiralty court would adjudicate claims arising
under diverse state statutes if their disruptive effects on uniformity
were not felt to be of national significance. Just v. Chambers6 and
Standard Dredging Co. v. Murphy97 refused to expand the Jensen
uniformity principle beyond its initial application to state work-
men's compensation acts. Davis v. Department of Labor and
Industry's perceived a "twilight zone" in which the applicability of
uniformity principles was dependent not on an assessment of which
side of the maritime but local line a case fell, but upon a factual
determination, that is, whether the state statute in fact interferes
with a harmonious and uniform federal maritime law.
Jensen and Davis" viewed the harmony/uniformity inquiry as
being essentially similar to the inquiry that is conducted to deter-
mine whether state action has unduly burdened interstate com-
merce. By analogizing admiralty and maritime uniformity to inter-
state commerce uniformity, Jensen contained the seeds for its future
limitation. States have traditionally been able to exercise their po-
lice powers over matters of local concern even if interstate commerce
93. 244 U.S. at 216.
94. Id. at 216.
95. 257 U.S. 233 (1921).
96. 312 U.S.' 383 (1941).
97. 319 U.S. 306 (1943).
98. 317 U.S. 249, 254-57 (1942).
99. 317 U.S. 249 (1942).
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is affected or partially regulated. 00 There is no presumption of fed-
eral preemption. To the contrary, there is a presumption which
favors the validity of state action and "persuasive reasons" must be
shown for federal preemption: "either that the nature of the regu-
lated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Con-
gress has unmistakably so ordained."''
A leading case of federal preemption under the commerce
clause, Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, '" is iilustra-
tive of these principles. In that case a vessel whose boilers were
licensed and approved under federal boiler inspection laws was pen-
alized under a city ordinance for excessive boiler emissions. The
Court, in upholding the state's pollution abatement power, cau-
tioned against seeking "conflicts between state and federal regula-
tion where none clearly exist."'0' The federal laws were "limited to
affording protection from the perils of maritime navigation," while
the ordinance was designed to "protect the health and enhance the
cleanliness of the local community"; thus, neither conflicted nor
overlapped in purpose.'°0 The local regulation was an "even handed"
attempt to "effectuate a local public interest" and was not "unduly
burdensome on maritime activities or interstate commerce."''0
Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc. '0 affirms the
continuing relevance to maritime uniformity of Huron's require-
ment of clear conflict between state and federal law, as a condition
to preemption of state jurisdiction. In Askew, the Court concluded
that Florida's oil spill law could apply to shore facilities and vessels
on navigable waters, despite the presence of federal oil spill regula-
tions covering similar areas and damages. "[T]he issue comes
down to whether a state constitutionally may exercise its police
power respecting maritime activities concurrently with the Federal
Government.' 017 Noting the absence of an express preemption of
state action in the federal statute, and the inability of the federal
regulations to remedy and provide damages for all local injuries that
were of concern to the state, the Court answered its question in the
affirmative. Pollution protection, an historical state police power,
would not be taken away "silently" by federal regulation where, as
100. See South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
101. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
102. 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
103. Id. at 446.
104. Id. at 445-46.
105. Id. at 443-44.
106. 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
107. Id. at 337, 341.
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in Askew, the federal regulations did not purport to provide the
exclusive remedy. 108
Another area of interest in the development of federal uniform-
ity with implications for state maritime jurisdiction is based on the
inherent tension between Jensen and Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins.'"1 At one end, Jensen and its similarly-minded succes-
sors espouse the necessity of a uniform federal maritime law. Erie,
at the other end, requires state substantive law to be used on the
law side of a federal district court sitting in diversity. Problems arise
over whose law is to apply in diversity cageg when the iues in the
district court are essentially maritime. In this area there is a strong
reaffirmation of Jensen. Pope and Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn,"' Garrett
v. Moore-McCormack Co., "' and Kossick v. United Fruit Co."2 all
noted that whatever the remedy to be enforced, and wherever the
forum, if federal maritime law controlled the underlying cause of
action its supremacy would have to be upheld."' These cases thus
support the proposition that Erie will not be followed in diversity
actions if its effect will be to destroy a necessary maritime uniform-
ity by interjecting disharmonious state substantive law.",
Summarized briefly, uniformity doctrines dictate that when a
federal court is sitting on maritime matters in diversity, state sub-
stantive law must be applied unless its application would frustrate
principles of harmony and uniformity. When a federal court sits in
admiralty, federal substantive law applies unless it is incomplete or
nonexistent, in which case the legal nexus can be supplemented or
supplied by state law subject to two caveats. The first is that admi-
ralty can only apply state substantive law if traditional admiralty
remedies are not diluted or compromised. The second caveat is that
admiralty, like the law side, will not apply state law if substantial
principles of harmony and uniformity will be contravened." 5 Con-
108. Although Huron and Askew discuss federal statutory preemption while admiralty's
supremacy rests for the most part in case law (see Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Ins. Co.,
348 U.S. 310 (1953)), the concepts of preemption and federal supremacy are sufficiently
analogous for present purposes. See part IV, infra.
109. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
110. 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
111. 317 U.S. 239 (1942).
112. 365 U.S. 731 (1961).
113. See O.F. Shearer & Sons, Inc. v. Decker, 349 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
114. See St. Hilaire Moye v. Henderson; 496 F.2d 973 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 884 (1975).
115. See, e.g., Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); St. Hilaire Moye v.
Henderson, 496 F.2d 973 (8th Cir. 1974); Houston-New Orleans, Inc. v. Page Eng'r. Co. 353
F. Supp. 890 (E.D. La. 1972); Kalyvakis v. The T.S.S. Olympia, 181 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y.
1960).
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versely, when a state court is litigating rights predicated on mari-
time law it must fully protect the federal rights of the parties even
if this means rejecting case or statutory law of its own jurisdiction, "'
unless a variant of the "maritime but local" doctrine can be ap-
plied."'7
V. Is THERE FEDERAL SUBSTANTIVE LAW, OTHER THAN SALVAGE,
APPLICABLE TO MARINE ANTIQUITIES?
This question, impliedly presented in Treasure Salvors, Inc. v.
Abandoned Sailing Vessel Believed to be the Nuestra Senora de
Atocha, "1 appears to have been answered negatively. There, the
United States claimed both title and possession to an apparently
abandoned 17th century Spanish vessel and its cargo that lay on the
United States continental shelf more than three miles off the Flor-
ida coast." 9 Federal claims were predicated on the Antiquities Act 2 '
and the Abandoned Property Act. 2' The Court held both inapplica-
ble and concluded that in the absence of a clear expression of Con-
gressional intent to retain title to abandoned property, the finder
was entitled to possession and title, and jurisdiction was properly
in admiralty applying salvage law.
The Abandoned Property Act, whose legislative origins have
been unclear to the courts which have analyzed it, authorizes the
116. See generally, Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731 (1961); St. Hilaire Moye
v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 973 (8th Cir. 1974); G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY
51 (2d ed. 1975).
117. See, e.g., Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731 (1961); Wilburn Boat Co. v.
Fireman's Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955).
118. 408 F. Supp. 907 (S.D. Fla. 1976), aff'd., No. 76-2151 (5th Cir. Mar. 13, 1978).
119. 46 U.S.C. § 724 (1847) provides, in pertinent part:
No vessel or master thereof, shall be regularly employed inthe business of wreck-
ing on the coast of Florida without the license of the judge of the district court
for the district of Florida ....
In Pent v. $2,850, 19 F. Cas. 205, (S.D. Fla. 1880) (No. 10, 961a), the statutory predeces-
sor of 46 U.S.C. § 724 was held applicable to salvors in the business of saving lives and
property in immediate distress. When an artifacts salvor sought a federal license in In re
Andrews, 266 F. Supp. 162, 164 (M.D. Fla. 1967), the court analyzed the Act's brief legislative
and judicial history and found it inapplicable to antiquities salvage. Unfortunately, without
citation or analysis, a license was awarded to an antiquities salvor shortly after Andrews in
In re Marine Archeological Enterprises, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 477, 478 (S.D. Fla. 1968). Consider-
ing the early 19th Century origins of the Act, its legislative history and the language of the
Act itself-alluding to vessels in "distress"-and the failure of the 1968 case to set forth its
reasoning, it is safe to assume that the 1968 case was improperly decided. It is thus unneces-
sary to discuss the preemptive effects of federal vessel licensing. See Douglas v. Seacoast
Products, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 1740 (1977).
120. 16 U.S.C. §§ 432, 433 (1970).
121. 40 U.S.C. § 310 (1970).
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General Services Administration to make contracts or provisions as
it deems to be in the government's best interest,
for the preservation, sale, or collection of any property, or the
proceeds thereof, which may have been wrecked, abandoned, or
become derelict, being within the jurisdiction of the United
States and which ought to come to the United States, and in such
contracts to allow such compensation to any person giving infor-
mation thereof, or who shall actually preserve, collect, surrender,
or pay over the same .... 12
The phrase in the Abandoned Property Act "ought to come to the
United States" has proved the most resistant to uniform judicial
interpretation. Interpreting identical language in the statutory
predecessor to the Act, Russell v. Forty Bales of Cotton23 and
United States v. Tyndale124 rejected a claim of federal exclusivity
similar to the one argued by the government in Treasure Salvors.
In Tyndale the phrase was construed to apply not to all abandoned
property but only property in which the United States had a special
equity. Russell interpreted the section as having no prospective ap-
plication, but rather as applicable only to the voluminous amount
of debris generated by the Civil War.
Part of the Russell rationale on which the Court in Treasure
Salvors relied was weakened by a subsequent executive determia-
tion that the section also covered vessels destroyed in the Spanish-
American War lying off the Cuban coast, unless the United States
had abandoned them or allowed them to become derelict.2 5 The
section continues to be utilized sporadically for wreck removal.
Whether it has been administratively interpreted as limited to his-
torical property is unclear.'
The Court in Treasure Salvors rejected the Abandoned Prop-
erty Act's application to the vessel on the additional ground that the
vessel was not "within the jurisdiction of the United States"' as
required by the Act. The Court read the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act 2 8 in conjunction with the subsequently ratified Conven-
tion on the Continental Shelf,"9 and relied on the International Law
Commission's 1956 commentary to a proposed treaty article which
122. Id.
123. 21 F. Cas. 42 (S.D. Fla. 1872) (No. 12,154).
124. 116 F. 820, 822 (1st Cir. 1902).
125. 23 Op. ATr'Y. GEN. 76 (1900).
126. See S. REP. No. 234, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1575 (1965).
127. Treasure Salvors, 408 F. Supp. at 910.
128. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1970).
129. [1964] 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
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excluded wrecks from the definition of "natural resources."'" Analo-
gous language in the Antiquities Act ("situate on lands owned or
controlled by the Government of the United States") was similarly
relied on by the Court to justify a rejection of its applicability.
The first section of the Antiquities Act allows the Secretaries
of Interior, Agriculture and Army to issue permits to qualified insti-
tutions "for the examination of ruins, the excavation of archaeologi-
cal sites, and the gathering of objects of antiquity upon the lands
under their respective jurisdictions . ..."I", The second section
provides penalties for nonpermitted activities directed at "any his-
toric or prehistoric ruin, or monument, or any object of antiquity,
situate on lands owned or controlled by the Government of the
United States. ... "132 The Court concluded that the Act and sup-
plemental regulations'33 were not meant to apply to the Outer Conti-
nental Shelf and that the phrase "object of antiquity" was too vague
to support criminal sanctions.'3 United States v. Diaz,"'3 cited by
the Court for the latter proposition, concerned a conviction for pil-
fering Apache face masks (circa 1969 or 1970) from the reservation
gravesite. The applicability of this holding to an object of undis-
puted antiquity in Treasure Salvors, a 1622 Spanish ship, is ques-
tionable.
The Court in Treasure Salvors concluded by inferring that the
existing statutory scheme for shelf exploitation was limited to natu-
ral resources, and that it was for that purpose alone that the United
States had extended its resource jurisdiction (and not its sover-
eignty). If the Court were to rule that federal shelf jurisdiction had
been extended to nonresources, it envisioned that an "international
controversy" might well be provoked. 3 Although Treasure Salvors
drew acceptable inferences from the law it cited, it inexplicably
failed to discuss relevant and significant trends toward the protec-
tion of cultural property in the international sector, which could
have made the Court's fear of international repercussions unneces-
130. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly 11 U.N.
GOAR Supp. (No. 9), U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956) reprinted in [19561 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N
298, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.1:
It is clearly understood that the rights in question [to exploit the natural re-
sources of the shelf) do not cover objects such as wrecked ships and their cargoes
(including bullion) lying on the seabed or covered by the sand of the subsoil,
131. 16 U.S.C. § 432 (1970).
132. 16 U.S.C. § 433 (1970).
133. 43 C.F.R. §§ 3.1-.17 (1976).
134. Treasure Salvors, 408 F. Supp. at 911, aff'd., No. 76-2151 (5th Cir. Mar. 13, 1978).
135. 499 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'g. 368 F. Supp. 856 (D. Ariz. 1973).
136. Treasure Salvors, 408 F. Supp. at 911, aff'd., No. 76-2151 (5th Cir. Mar. 13, 1978).
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sarily speculative and remote.'37 Treasure Salvors also failed, al-
though in this instance understandably so, to discuss those numer-
ous and diverse national evidences of renewed cultural interest that
may well provide a basis for federal preemption of marine antiqui-
ties protection and recovery outside traditional admiralty practice.
Congress has tentatively addressed the problem of marine anti-
quities preservation in the Marine Protcction, Research and Sanc-
tuaries Act of 1972'1 ("Marine Sanctuaries Act"). The Secretary of
Commerce under that Act is empowered to designate marine sanc-
tuaries "for the purpose of preserving or restoring such areas for
their conservation, recreational, ecological or esthetic value," as far
seaward as the outer edge of the continental shelf, as the latter term
is defined in the Convention on the Continental Shelf.' 9 Since the
"exploitability" test in the Geneva Convention establishes an am-
bulatory boundary for the continental shelf, sanctuary boundaries
may well be coextensive with the conjunction of the continental rise
and the abyssal plain. In any case, marine sanctuaries may be desig-
nated on the continental shelf, even if the legal status of the slope
and rise remains unclear.
It is clear that sanctuary designations within the territorial sea
of the United States are binding on both the United States and
foreign nations, under elementary principles of territorial jurisdic-
tion. In areas beyond the territorial sea, the Administrator of the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, to whom sanc-
tuary rulemaking authority was delegated by the Secretary of Com-
merce, 14 0 has had slightly more difficulty defining jurisdictional con-
cepts.
The original draft of the regulation defining jurisdiction over
United States citizens and foreign nationals in sanctuaries seaward
of the territorial sea stated:
In accordance with international law, the United States has ex-
clusive jurisdiction over resources within the territorial sea and
the contiguous zone . . . . It is not anticipated . . . that use
137. See State v. Bundrant, 546 P.2d 530, 539-42 (Alas. 1976).
138. 16 U.S.C. H 1431-1434 (Supp. V 1975).
139. 16 U.S.C. § 1432(a) (Supp. V 1975). See generally 15 C.F.R. 922.1-.34 (1977).
The Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 129, art. 1(a), defines "continental
shelf" as the seabed and subsoil seaward to where the superjacent water depth is 200 meters,
or beyond that "to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of
the natural resources of the said areas."
Unfortunately, the Marine Sanctuaries Act also allows a State Governor to certify as
unacceptable any portions of a proposed sanctuary lying within state waters. 16 U.S.C. §
1432(b) (1974).
140. 39 Fed. Reg. 10255 (March 18, 1974) (codified in 15 C.F.R. § 922.1 (1977)).
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restrictions would be imposed on citizens beyond the contiguous
zone without also restricting the use of the same area to foreign
citizens .... "
The proposed rule was inconsistent with its enabling legislation
which stated that in the absence of treaty or recognized principles
of international law, "no regulation applicable to ocean waters out-
side the territorial jurisdiction of the United States shall be applied
to a person not a citizen of the United States.""' The draft was also
inconsistent with United States responsibilities under the Conven-
tion on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone which limited
coastal state contiguous zone jurisdiction to enforcement of custom,
fiscal, immigration and sanitary regulations." 3 The final version of
the regulation, however, limited its application beyond the terri-
torial sea to "foreign citizens only to the extent consistent -with
international law.' 44
Pursuant to the Marine Sanctuaries Act, on January 1, 1975,
the Secretary of Commerce designated a vertical cylinder of ocean
water and seabed, one mile in diameter, 16.10 miles south-southeast
of the Cape Hatteras Light, as the "Monitor Marine Sanctuary."
The U. S. S. Monitor was the Union warship of Monitor versus
Merrimac fame that foundered and sank in December, 1862, in a
storm off Cape Hatteras."4 Rules were established for mariners
using the area including one prohibiting "any type of subsurface
salvage or recovery operation" directed against the vessel. All work
that would involve anchoring or diving within the circumference of
the cylinder, required a permit."16
If the federal government, through the Marine Sanctuaries Act,
can assert paramount rights over antiquities like the U.S.S.
Monitor, there is no reason why it cannot employ the Act to assert
control over other marine antiquities of cultural significance. The
initial application of the Act to the U.S.S. Monitor, however, while
welcome as a portent of federal interest in marine antiquities, may
ultimately frustrate the Act's wider application. The U.S.S.
Monitor is such an undisputed historical treasure that its protection
and salvage is an uncertain precedent for the application of the
Marine Sanctuaries Act to less significant marine artifacts. Had a
Monitor-type sanctuary been declared for a vessel not so promi-
141. Id. at 10256, § 922.12.
142. 16 U.S.C. § 1432(9) (Supp. V 1975).
143. [1964] 15 U.S.T. 1606 (pt. 11, Art. 24), T.I.A.S. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
144. 15 C.F.R. § 922.12 (1977).
145. M. BOOTNER, THE CIVIL WAR DICTIONARY 560-61 (1959).
146. 15 C.F.R. §§ 924.1-.8 (1977). See also 40 Fed. Reg. 21706 (May 19, 1975).
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nently connected with United States naval history, the conclusions
to be drawn from such a declaration would have been clearer. The
fact that the U.S.S. Monitor was, and possibly still is, a commis-
sioned United States Navy vessel, is also of some concern. The
precedential value of the Monitor sanctuary for the preservation and
salvage of nongovernment vessels will be diminished if the sanc-
tuary may be narrowly viewed as an assertion of the United States
government's policy of retaining salvage rights to all its vessels un-
less those vessels are specifically abandoned. "'
Despite its minor shortcomings, the Monitor sanctuary remains
the most unequivocal assertion of federal interest in marine antiqui-
ties. The Monitor sanctuary, however, is just one manifestation of
what seems to be a general national and international cultural
awakening. Nationally, the federal awakening has found varied ex-
ecutive and legislative expression.
By executive order in 1971, the President pledged federal lead-
ership in preserving, maintaining and restoring the historic and
cultural environment of the nation. Federal agencies were called
upon to administer cultural properties on lands under their control
for future generations, and provision was made for the identifica-
tion and preservation of sites, structures and objects located on
federal lands and possessing historical, architectural or archaeologi-
cal significance. There is no indication that marine antiquities were
to be specifically protected. The language of the order suggests, if
anything, a distinct orientation toward terrestrial artifacts"
The executive order complements diverse congressional efforts
to protect the national cultural heritage. A significant body of rele-
vant legislation and implementing regulations now exists in this
area. "9 But here, too, marine artifacts are not singled out for an
individualized regulatory treatment.
147. United States control over its sunken government vessels takes two main forms. The
first, through 46 U.S.C. § 316(d), is a prohibition of all foreign salvage operations in United
States waters except those conducted pursuant to treaty. The second is the protection of the
salvage rights of the government in vessels which have gone down both on the high seas and
in foreign territorial waters. See Secretary-of-State Rusk's airgram to the American Embassy,
Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, April 29, 1965, in M. WHITEMAN, 9 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 221
(1968).
While Rusk's directions to the Embassy state that the United States "retains title [to
its sunken vessels] subject to explicit transfer or abandonment," dicta in Baltimore, Crisfield
& Onancock Line Inc. v. United States, 140 F.2d 230 (4th Cir. 1944) suggests that the United
States by its less than explicit action or inaction can also effect an abandonment.
148. Exec. Order No. 11,593, 3 C.F.R. § 559 (1971-1975 Compilation).
149. E.g., Historic Sites Act of 1935, 16 U.S.C. § 461 (1970); Natural Historic Preserva-
tion Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1970); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42
U.S.C. § 4321 (1970); Archeological and Historic Preservation Act of 1974, 16 U.S.C. § 469
(1970); American Antiquities Preservation Act; 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1970).
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A more promising federal program is directed toward preserving
parklands on the aquatic margins of the nation. There are many
aquatic areas reserved by the federal government which, unlike the
Monitor sanctuary, are not expressly designed to preserve marine
antiquities, but will necessarily have this effect. The Key Largo
Coral Reef Marine Sanctuary,'5 0 for instance, which extends east-
ward and seaward from the three mile territorial limit to the 300'
isobath, undoubtedly encompasses and has provided for the protec-
tion of marine artifacts within its borders.'5 ' Administrative protec-
tion for marine artifacts is also afforded within national seashores,
lakeshores, scenic waterways, recreational areas and monuments,
which usually include offshore buffer zones of submerged lands and
superjacent waters.'52 For one national seashore, at Point Reyes,
California, whose offshore extent is one-quarter mile,'53 the House
Report in support of the Bill establishing the seashore specifically
alluded to certain marine archaeological features which made the
area worthy of inclusion within the National Seashore system.'54
Finally, there are two federal enactments which, although of
undetermined significance to the antiquities jurisdiction question,
are nevertheless of importance when offshore resources are dis-
cussed. There is a possibility that the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act, previously discussed in the context of Treasure Salvors,
and the Submerged Lands Act, 15 have affected the relative jurisdic-
tion of state and federal governments over marine antiquities.
Following the Submerged Lands Act, in which "natural re-
sources" underlying state territorial waters were quitclaimed to the
150. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1432-1433 (Supp. V 1975).
151. 15 C.F.R. § 929 (1977). 15 C.F.R. § 929.4(d) (1977) provides:
No person shall wilfully destroy, molest, deface, remove, displace or tamper with
an archeological or historical resource or cargo pertaining to submerged wrecks
within the boundaries of the sanctuary.
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, however, is authorized to permit
salvage operations within the sanctuary. 15 C.F.R. § 929.6 (1977).
152. See, e.g., Cape Cod National Seashore, 16 U.S.C. § 459b (1970) (1/4 mile offshore);
Padre Island National Seashore, 16 U.S.C. § 459d (1970) (offshore to the two fathom line);
Assateague Island National Seashore, 16 U.S.C. § 459f (1974) (out to '/2 mile beyond the mean
high water line). Generally prohibited in these coastal preserves is the possession or disturb-
ance of "any relic, artifact, ruin, or historic or prehistoric feature .... 36 C.F.R. § 2.20(b)(2)
(1976).
153. 16 U.S.C. § 459 (c-i) (Supp. V 1975).
154. The Point Reyes Peninsula offers a good site for archeological and his-
torical exploration .... Tradition, supported by most historians who have studied
the subject . . . has it that it was here that Sir Francis Drake stopped to repair
his Golden Hind in 1579 before starting across the Pacific. H.R. REP. No. 1628,
87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2, reprinted in [19621 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2500,
2502.
155. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301, 1302 (1970).
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states, the federal government retained only an attenuated control
over resource exploitation within state marine boundaries." 6 Con-
versely, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act"' and the decision
in United States v. Maine,5 8 foreclosed state hopes of at least con-
current jurisdiction over "national resources" beyond their terri-
torial waters.159
But neither the Submerged Lands Act nor the Outer Continen-
tal Shelf Lands Act can be read as conclusively vesting either sover-
eign with exclusive ownership of regulatory power over nonnatural
resources such as antiquities, on either side of the territorial bound-
ary. Both statutes are natural resource statutes and were never leg-
islatively intended, nor judicially construed, to be applicable to
marine artifacts.6 0 Similarly, the latest reaffirmation of federal con-
trol over the "offshore seabed" in United States v. Maine,'6" and
over "lands, minerals and other natural resources" in United States
v. Florida' neither tolls all state involvement in extraterritorial
control of nonnatural resources, nor creates the type of unavoidable
conflict over outer continental shelf antiquities regulation required
by Askew and Huron to invoke federal preemption. As to the Sub-
merged Lands Act and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act,
marine artifacts are clearly a sui generis resource."3
156. 43 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1) (1970). See also, Platoro Ltd. Inc. v. Unidentified remains
of a Vessel, 371 F. Supp. 351, 354 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
157. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1333(a)(3) (1970).
158. 420 U.S. 515 (1975).
159. "Natural resources" were defined in the Submerged Lands Act to include fuel and
other minerals and all marine animal and plant life. 43 U.S.C. § 1301(e) (1970). State juris-
diction was specifically extended to these natural resources. But the term natural was not
defined in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act which extended federal resource jurisdic-
tion not to the natural resources of the outer continental shelf but to its "subsoil and seabed."
43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2) (1970). See CONFERENCE REPORT OF THE HousE MANAGERS, [1953] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2184.
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act adopted state law for certain shelf resource
matters, 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2) (1970). It also excluded State jurisdiction "over the seabed
and subsoil of the outer Continental Shelf, or the property and natural resources thereof or
the revenues therefrom." 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(3) (1970). It is likely that the word "property"
was not meant to include marine artifacts but referred to artificial islands, fixed structures
and other extractive facilities.
160. See United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515, 527-28 (1975); United States v. Califor-
nia, 381 U.S. 139, 148-49 (1965); United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 5 (1960); Guess v.
Read, 290 F.2d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 957 (1962); State v. Bundrant,
546 P.2d 530, 545-47(Alas. 1976), appeal dismissed, 97 S. Ct. 40 (1976). Cf. United States v.
Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 719 (1950) (alluding to possible extension of the Act's application to
other than natural resources). But see United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699, 704 (1950).
161. 420 U.S. 515, 524 (1975).
162. 425 U.S. 791 (1976).
163. Hypothetical confrontations may easily be conjured between state or federal antiqu-
ities salvage, and federal marine resource jurisdiction. Cf. United States v. Ray, 423 F.2d 16
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Internationally, particularly under the aegis of the United Na-
tions Educational, Scientific & Cultural Organization (UNESCO),
conventions have been held and resolutions of principles prepared
on the inviolability of each nation's cultural patrimony."6 4 Follow-
ing the Caracas session of the Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea, draft treaty provisions resulted which also re-
flected international concern for antiquities preservation and reten-
tion. Provision was made for preservation or disposal "for the bene-
fit of the international community" of any objects of archaeological
or historical value found in those areas of the seabed and subsoil
beyond national jurisdiction. Rights of first refusal in these objects
were given to, alternatively, the state of origin, the state of cultural
origin, and the state of historical or archaeological origin.'65 This
provision was retained in the Informal Composite Negotiating
Text, '5 but presently there is no international law, in treaty or
custom, that obligates the United States to act in any particular
way toward most artifacts in its offshore waters.
The conclusion that has to be drawn from this brief review of
congressional and executive developments is that there is presently
no well defined federal substantive law of marine antiquities. While
the acts reserving coastal, riverine and lacustrine lands as sanctu-
aries and parks evidence a federal concern with marine artifacts as
a class of valuable marine resources, no coherent federal regulatory
scheme over these resources can yet be discerned. It is still too early
to tell how the Marine Sanctuaries Act will be interpreted. If a
uniform federal law for marine antiquities recovery is to be predi-
cated upon it, the Act must first be extensively and umambiguously
used to assert federal supremacy over historically significant aban-
(5th Cir. 1970) (considering jurisdiction to prevent damage to living reefs by excavation
methods); Key Largo Reef Preserve, 43 C.F.R. § 15.5 (1976).
164. See UNESCO Convention on the Illicit Movement of Art Treasures, Nov. 14, 1970;
826 U.N.T.S. No. 1-11806 (1970), reprinted in 10 INT'L. LEGAL MATERIALS 289 (1971);
UNESCO Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Nov.
16, 1972, 4 U.N.T.S. 275 Doc. No. 17-c/106 (1972), reprinted at 11 INT'L. LEGAL MATERIALS
1358 (1972); Treaty of Cooperation with the United Mexican States Providing for the Return
of Stolen Archeological, Historical and Cultural Properties, [1971] 1 U.S.T. 494; T.I.A.S.
7088. Of particular interest is the UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting the
Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Properties, which provides in
part that the States Partica will ".... admit actions for recovery of lost . . . items of
cultural property brought by or on behalf of the rightful owners." (Emphasis added). 14 INT'L.
PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT 7216, 7222 (1970).
165. See Informal Single Negotiating Text, A/CONF. 62/WP.8/ pt. 1, arts. 19(1), (2), (3)
(May 7,1975); Revised Single Negotiating Text, A/CONF.62/WP.8/Rev. 1/pt. 1, art. 19 (May
10, 1976).
166. Cf. Informal Composite Negotiating Text, A/CONF. 62/WP.10, art. 149 (July 15,
1977).
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doned vessels and cargoes, and not just United States Navy vessels.
Such an extensive use of the Act appears unlikely. Provision would
also have to be made, either by statute or regulation, for contractual
recovery of sunken antiquities. Since the U.S.S. Monitor is on the
bottom in one of the more treacherous areas of coastal waters, it
cannot fulfill its promise of visual appeal or practical historical
importance unless it is raised; ample remuneration for this task will
probably have to be agreed upon by contract.' Until the federal
government has started actively identifying, preserving and recover-
ing marine antiquities, both within and without its national sanctu-
aries, monuments and seashores, traditional concepts of salvage are
still the best developed substantive law the federal system can offer.
VI. WHAT LAW SHOULD APPLY To MARINE ANTIQUITIES?
A. Choosing the Applicable Substantive Law
The twin shibboleths of uniformity and harmony rarely point
the way to a resolution of what is essentially a conflict of laws
problem. Unless an established line of federal precedent or an un-
ambiguous federal statute is clearly violated by state action, subtler
tests must be employed than those which merely seek out overt
incompatibilities. Invariably, both the federal and state govern-
ments seek to vindicate their prescriptive competences and to assert
a legitimate interest and concern over the outcome. 6 ' The criteria
that courts have used to determine which sovereign's interest was
more intense, and whose concern more immediate, resolve largely
into a balancing test.
If a federal statute is involved, the test of "clear conflict" enun-
ciated in Huron and Askew will apply. Conflict is generally avoided
when the state action is designed to meet a different evil from that
reached by the federal statute and the action and statute thus com-
plement or supplement each other. When federal preemption is to
be inferred from federal case law alone, the inquiry becomes more
demanding.
At the outset, it must be determined whether a federal rule in
fact exists. If none exists, a choice must be made between creation
of a federal rule and adoption of existing state practice. Even if the
area to be scrutinized for the existence of a federal rule is clearly
maritime, an inquiry must nevertheless be made as to whether the
167. Reconnaissance and preliminary salvage contracts for the U.S.S. Monitor have, in
fact, been recently negotiated. OCEAN SCIENCE NEWS, August 1, 1977, at 5.
168. Cf. Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 739 (1961).
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area is of such local concern that deference can safely be paid to
state court practice. "Local concern" as a ratio decidendi may en-
compass two situations: those in which the state or one of its subdi-
visions has a legitimate regulatory interest equal to or greater than
that of the federal government; and those in which the federal gov-
ernment may have the superior interest, but either does not feel the
problem significant enough to justify the imposition of a merely
abstract or aesthetic uniformity, or fails to protect its own best
interests.
Courts engage in an historical factual inquiry to determine how
the subject matter concerned has been handled by the federal/state
system in the past. If prescriptive jurisdiction over the subject mat-
ter has been a concommitant of state sovereignty for a long period,
either exclusive of the federal system or concurrent with it, persu-
asive reasons probably exist for maintaining the status quo. Institu-
tions and individuals may have detrimentally relied on the contin-
uation of the existing state of affairs through irretrievable commit-
ments of resources. Of course, local courts must have shown them-
selves equal to the task of formulating workable rules in the dis-
puted area that have not proved injurious to interstate or foreign
commerce. Were federal courts to assume plenary exclusive jurisdic-
tion under these circumstances, new procedural and substantive
rules might have to be adopted; frequently federal courts are less
physically accessible and provide no greater procedural expedien-
cies for resolution of the dispute than state courts. A federal court
may also feel that although a uniform federal rule may be desirable,
the coalescence of all these complex factors makes Congress, rather
than the courts, the proper branch to formulate that rule.'
It is against this background of selection criteria and the "clear
conflict" rules of Huron and Askew that the consistency of federal
salvage principles with state antiquities laws must be considered.
B. Evaluating the Conflict Between Admiralty Salvage Principles
and State Antiquity Laws
Before comparing admiralty salvage and state law for areas of
conflict or congruence, it should be noted that admiralty jurisdic-
tion over marine antiquities is not affected by the location of the
antiquities landward or seaward of a state's offshore boundary. It is
of no consequence where the antiquities are located between mean
169. See generally id. at 739; Wilburn Boot Co. v. Firemans Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310,
316-20 (1955); Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556, 562-64 (1953); In re M/T Alva Cape,
405 F.2d 962, 970-71 (2d Cir. 1969); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 557-60 (1973).
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high water and the seaward limits of the outer continental shelf
since admiralty jurisdiction extends equally to all navigable wa-
ters.'70 However, state antiquity jurisdiction, unlike admiralty juris-
diction, is not as broad beyond state boundaries as within them.
The rudiments of prescriptive jurisdiction obviously prevent a state
from asserting the same power outside its territory as it exercises
within."' In short, within state borders admiralty salvage jurisdic-
tion is at least coextensive with that of the state, but a state's
antiquities jurisdiction is attenuated as a salvage dispute moves
seaward past its marine boundaries. Because no state presently as-
serts an unqualified extraterritorial antiquities jurisdiction, the fol-
lowing discussion will stress those federal/state antiquities conflicts
which occur within state borders.
The apparent conflicts between state antiquity law and federal
salvage law are most evident in the differences in approach each
takes to the recognition of a salvor's possessory interests and the
measure of a salvor's award. Turning first to the problem of salvor
possession, it appears that state assertions of title in objects that it
has never reduced to physical possession run counter to admiralty's
activist bias toward the quick and the strong. Admiralty liberally
rewards and encourages salvage by recognizing a salvor's possessory
claims to objects he recovers through the "prompt use of sufficient
means, both in getting at property needing relief and abiding with
it until its salvage is complete."'7 In contrast, state law does not
require the state as salvor actively to explore for or physically pos-
sess its marine antiquities as a condition to its claims of exclusive
possession and title.
The differences between what state and federal law conceive to
be the prerequisites for possession by a salvor may be attributed to
the fact that state antiquity laws have borrowed more freely from
principles of common law land salvage than from marine salvage.
Common law and admiralty salvage differ significantly. The com-
mon law recognized at an early date the illogic of attributing to
rational persons "abandonment" of valuable property, and resorted
instead to the concepts of "lost" and "mislaid" property and
"property embedded in the soil." "Lost" property is property
which must have passed unawares from the conscious control of its
170. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 116 §§ 1-11.
171. Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. 2569 (1977); Chicago's Last Dept. Store v. Indiana
Alcoholic Bey. Comm., 161 F. Supp. 1, 4 (N.D. Ind. 1958).
172. See Brady v. S.S. African Queen, 179 F. Supp. 321, 323 (E.D. Va. 1960) (possession
of half a derelict insufficient to establish rights in other half, two miles distant); The John
Wurts, 13 F. Cas. 903, 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1847) (No. 7,434).
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true owner. The true owner of lost property retains rights of owner-
ship paramount to both those of the finder and those of the owner
of the locus in quo. In the absence of a claim or appearance by the
true owner, as will happen after a chattel has been long lost, the
possessory rights of the finder of the chattel will normally be supe-
rior to those of the owner of the locus in quo."7 3 In recognizing the
superior possessory claims of a finder, land salvage approximates
admiralty's treatment of a salvor of abandoned property. But if
the finder's discovery follows a trespass on the locus in quo, or the
owner of the locus in quo has previously acquired a special equity
in the find, it is possible that the possessory interest of the owner
of the locus in quo will be paramount to that of the finder. It is in
this situation that land salvage, unlike admiralty, will include in its
possession equation a third possessory interest in lost chattels
beside those of the true owner and the finder, namely, the interest
of the owner of the locus in quo.
Land salvage invests the owner of the locus in quo with even
greater possessory rights if the distressed chattels qualify as either
"mislaid" property or "property embedded in the soil." "Mislaid"
property, voluntarily parted with or cached away and then forgot-
ten, is fictively presumed to create a bailment in the owner of the
locus in quo, who thereby acquires possessory rights superior to
those of the finder.' "Property embedded in the soil" is a protean
category cutting across various combinations of true owners, finders
and types of buried property. Under this category, buried chattels,
usually of a hopelessly ancient and untraceable origin, belong to the
owner of the locus in quo in his capacity as holder of a fee simple
interest in both the surface and subsurface of his land. 175
It is apparent from this brief review that land "salvage" doc-
trines have created a substantial property right in the owner of land
on which the true owner of chattels happens to have parted, volun-
tarily or involuntarily, with his possessions. The owner of the locus
173. Groover v. Tippins, 179 S.E. 634, 635 (Ga. Ct. App. 1935); Durfee v. Jones, 11 R.I.
588, 591, 23 Am. R. 528 (1877); Schley v. Couch, 155 Tex. 195, 196, 284 S.W.2d 333, 335 (1955).
174. Schley v. Couch, 155 Tex. 195, 284 S.W.2d 333, 335-36 (1955); Bridges v. Hawkes-
worth, 21 L.J.Q.B. 75, 78 (1851). See also Armory v. Delamarie, 1 Strange 505 (1722) (early
leading English case stating the same general principle).
175. It is far from clear why finders of property embedded in the soil should be treated
differently than finders of lost property. Perhaps a distinction is justified when the artifact,
through changes wrought by extreme age, has functionally become one with the locus in quo,
and the artifact's finder has never been expressly or impliedly licensed to excavate upon the
locus in quo. See Platoro Ltd. Inc. v. Unidentified Remains of a Vessel, 371 F. Supp. 356,
359-60 (S.D. Tex. 1970); Allred v. Biegel, 240 Mo. App. 818, 219 S.W.2d 665 (1949) See also
Elwes v. Brigg Gas Co., [1886] 33 Ch. D. 562, 55 L.J. Ch. 734 (1886).
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in quo obtains a possessory interest in chattels on or in his land
without exerting the Slightest physical effort or harboring the most
fleeting possessory intent. Transpose these precepts to state antiq-
uity statutes and it is seen that state claims of title to sunken
artifacts are merely the predictable concomitants, in the land sal-
vage tradition, of state control qua owner of the locus in quo, over
their submerged lands.
Admiralty has clearly remained unaffected by these principles
of land salvage. Admiralty has not only failed to create special rights
in sunken property in the owners of the submerged locus in quo, but
has coupled its indifference to land ownership as a decisional factor
with a decided preference for those who are most active and success-
ful in subjecting sunken property to physical possession. In sum-
mary, admiralty subscribes to a theory of possession which vests
possessory rights only in those who reduce sunken property to de
facto or physical possession; antiquity laws, drawing on land salvage
principles, allow possession to vest in those (such as owners of the
locus in quo) who merely intend to exclude others from possession
of chattels on their lands. "'
Obviation of the conflict between admiralty and state law that
the two underlying theories of possession may engender will depend
on the extent to which these antithetical theories can be reconciled
in practice. Under realistic physical circumstances of a type that
would surround most salvage operations, the two theories of posses-
sion do share a common ground. Conceptually, it is impossible ever
to possess and control completely any tangible object. A superior
force, whether private, governmental or natural may-always be pos-
ited that can destroy what purported to be the exclusive physical
control exercised over an object by its first possessor. The elusive-
ness of complete physical control over objects becomes more appar-
ent when those objects are artifacts buried in a hostile aquatic me-
dium characterized by high density and pressure, and low tempera-
ture and visibility. Even if it is physically controlled to the extent
the environment permits, no marine artifact before being raised and
confined on board ship can ever be perfectly secured from the addi-
tional threat of outside interference by human agencies. Competing
salvors, by stealth or superior equipment and technique, always
have the potential to preempt the first salvors and subject the arti-
fact to an even higher degree of physical domination. " Clearly,
since the physical domination of an artifact by any salvor can never
176. Hannah v. Peel, 114 L.J.K.B. 533, 539 (1945).
177. See, e.g., Rickard v. Pringle, 293 F. Supp. 981 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
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be complete, de facto or physical control of an artifact must always
consist of limited physical control supplemented by constructive
acts designed to warn competitors that physical domination is, in
fact, complete. Conversely, in state antiquity laws, the verbal or
legislative manifestations by the owner of the locus in quo of an
intent to exclude others from possession of a marine artifact are
invariably accompanied by some de facto possessory activities that
aid in communicating and forcing recognition of the intent to ex-
clude.78 The reconciliation of the two theories thus lies in the impos-
sibility of one theory being implemented without the other. Every
assertion of possession must be the sum of its physical and nonphys-
ical indicia of possessory exclusivity.
Once it is recognized that the two theories of possession imper-
ceptibly grade into each other, their reconciliation in the case of a
particular state statute should not be frustrated by the a priori
assumption that the declaration of title in the statute is offensive
to admiralty's bias toward active possession. Rather, the inquiry in
each case should be one of determining whether at the time a marine
artifact is discovered it is already subject, or simultaneously with
its discovery becomes subject, to a state possessory interest equal
or superior to that of a salvor in admiralty.'79 The "state possessory
interest" this inquiry would seek to reveal is one that can only be
generated by a level of state de facto or physical possessory activity
that is consistent with admiralty's activist bias. The inquiry de-
mands an assessment both of the text of the state statute and the
state's individual and joint field efforts with its licensed salvors for
evidence of active state involvement in antiquities recovery beyond
mere legislative fiat.
At the heart of most states' active possessory efforts are statu-
tory provisions for both licensing private salvors and rendering var-
ious supportive services to these salvors and the antiquities salvag-
ing venture generally. Through and in conjunction with its licensee-
salvor, who functions as its field operations arm, the state assumes
a status analagous to that of a co-salvor or co-possessor in every
salvaging venture in state waters. Once the state becomes a co-
salvor with its licensee, there is no longer a conceptual difficulty in
applying agency principles and regarding the possessory field activi-
ties of the licensee as equally and simultaneously those of the state.
178. Cf. F. POLLOCK, AN ESSAY ON POSSESSION IN THE COMMON LAW 13, 25, 40 (1888)
(tracing the concept of possession and its indices, including feudal customs as related to
ownership).
179. See generally cases cited, supra notes 13-20; Tay, Bridges v. Hawkesworth and the
Early History of Finding, 8 AM. J. LEGAL HIST, 224 (1964).
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But there is no need to consider the state solely as a vicarious de
facto possessor. The state may be quite active in its own right. If a
state were to chart wrecks, provide bottom, hydrologic and meteo-
rologic data, research and catalogue historical facts, and through its
onboard supervisors aid the recovery effort in other active ways,
there would be no difficulty in regarding the state as an active co-
salvor.15 0
Although it is helpful as an analogy to regard the state as a co-
salvor, a literal application of this appellation to the state would be
attendant with certain problems. It could be argued that if a state
refuses to license a salvor until the contractual terms it desired were
secured, the state would abuse its superior bargaining position, con-
tribute to the peril in which the sunken goods remain, and should
not be permitted to share in the fruits of the recovery.'' There is
also a danger that if both the state and its licensee-salvor were to
be strictly regarded as co-salvors, admiralty might find in this rela-
tionship added reason to subject the state and its licensee to its
jurisdiction. Since admiralty would apportion a salvage award
based on each salvor's physical efforts, the state would be stripped
of control over its marine artifacts when the proceeds of the antiqui-
ties salvage were divided, on the rationale that the state's efforts
were merely supportive. Despite these potential pitfalls, the co-
salvor analogy is nevertheless helpful in analyzing the level of state
activity necessary to create possessory interests consistent with
those recognized by admiralty.
An ancillary means exists by which a state statute may express
a state's de facto possessory interest in its antiquities. Through
criminal and civil sanctions and provisions for their field implemen-
tation by land and marine police agencies, state antiquity statutes
actively exclude the unlicensed antiquities salvor from state lands
and from antiquities on those lands by prosecuting him, respec-
tively, as both a trespassor and a thief.
It is thus apparent that what was at first called a conflict be-
tween the philosophies of possession subscribed to by state and
federal salvors is hardly an irreconcilable one, if it deserves to be
called a conflict at all. In actual practice, salvage under the antiqui-
ties laws of most states demands a considerable degree of active
state participation. What conflict exists is likely to have been gener-
ated by those statutory.provisions which insist on declaring antiqui-
180. See The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1, 12 (1869).
181. Cf. The Clarita and the Clara, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 1, 19 (1874) (discussing denial of
salvage claims to a party instigating or aggravating the endangered condition of a vessel).
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ties to be, without more, the property of the state. While virtually
all state statutes share these provisions, they usually may be disas-
sociated from the remainder of the statute without affecting its
overall validity as an exercise of the state's police and proprietary
powers.
A second way in which state antiquity regulations may run
afoul of admiralty salvage policy is through provisions for both bar-
gaining with the salvor over the size of his reward and disassociating
the size of the reward from the intensity of the salvage effort. Admi-
ralty, it has been observed, traditionally allows a salvor of aban-
doned property his entire find, but no state statute is quite that
permissive. The differences in approach create two areas of poten-
tial conflict.
The more fundamental conflict of the two is generated when a
state sees fit to allow a salvor, by contract, arbitral award or judg-
ment, less than what admiralty would award. In the case of aban-
doned property-where admiralty gives the salvor all and the state
allows him less than all-the conflict is apparent. If ownership of
derelict property is in question, another facet of the same problem
is revealed. Admiralty will allow the salvor of a derelict at least a
moiety while a state statute may well give the salvor less.
The second problem is that even if a state liberally awards its
contractual salvors of derelict and abandoned antiquities, there
may often by an uncertainty to the state's award system that differ-
entiates it from the greater predictability of the admiralty practice.
Admiralty is usually jealous of its methods of computing salvage
awards and suspicious of competing systems of salvor recompense.
In The Star, "2 for example, the claimant defended against a salvage
claim by arguing that the aid libellant gave him by pulling his boat
off a reef was part of custom and usage of reciprocal gratuitous
salvage that prevailed among fishermen in the area. The response
of the court in defense of admiralty's system of reward is pertinent
here:
While the expectation of like assistance in time of need may
furnish a strong incentive to the owner of the boats in this trade
to aid other boats, so employed, in distress, the receipt of such
award is uncertain, and in no way dependent upon the risk taken
or success achieved. The court cannot say that the incentive fur-
nished by such a custom, if it exists, is as strong as that growing
out of the right the admiralty law gives to a salvage award. Such
182. 130 F.2d 890 (W.D. Wash. 1931).
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being the case, to give effect to such a custom as superceding the
right to a salvage award would be contrary to public policy.
18 3
There are no statistical proofs of the efficacy of admiralty's
much-touted system of predictable awards. It is not possible to
prove that a salvor who recovers the entire value of his find will be
more honest than a salvor who must share his find with the state.
Notwithstanding this difficulty of proof, conflict between admiralty
and state law may still be avoided by inquiring into the reasons for
admiralty's generous rewards and determining how the evils admi-
ralty sought to correct are remedied by state antiquity statutes.
Admiralty has always thought that if a salvor was liberally
rewarded, his "every temptation to embezzlement and dishonesty"
would be removed.' 4 Unquestionably, the states believe the same to
be true. But whereas admiralty has relied solely on the carrot, the
states seek to insure salvor rectitude by a combination of carrot and
stick. The conflict between admiralty and state law resolves into
comparison of their respective effectiveness in preventing salvor dis-
honesty. If state statutes are relatively effective, then abandoned
and derelict marine antiquities will be placed beyond the reach of
a dishonest salvor since the state will be apprised of his interest and
will license and supervise him, thus rendering groundless admi-
ralty's fear of secret dishonesty. If state statutes are relatively inef-
fective, they will be so largely because it is not difficult to conduct
a surreptitious pilferage of antiquated vessels and cargoes even
though they are buried under many feet of sand off the coasts of a
populous country. Given this situation, it is unlikely that admi-
ralty's carrot will serve as a more effective restraint on secret dis-
honesty. A pilferer who would avoid state antiquity laws and risk
criminal sanctions for an additional small percentage of the take
would not be the type of salvor who would invoke admiralty's sal-
vage jurisdiction in the absence of a state statute.
There is no reason to believe that admiralty's approach to the
problem of salvor dishonesty is any more effective than that fash-
ioned by the states. One may well intuitively feel, to the contrary,
that there is more dissuasive power in the states' reward/punish-
183. Id. at 891. But see Platoro Ltd., Inc. v. Unidentified Remains of a Vessel, 371 F.
Supp.'356, 361 (S.D. Tex. 1973), where the federal court approved a 50-50 split agreement
between the salvor and the state: "Where the parties at interest have so agreed among
themselves, this court sees no reason why it should interfere, if the negotiations carried on
amounted in the eyes of this court, to a predetermined contract of salvage."
It is unclear from the opinion whether the court agreed with the adequacy of the reward,
or was merely implementing the contractual intent of the parties.
184. The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1, 14 (1869).
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ment combination. Nor is there any apparent reason to believe
that the remuneration of antiquities salvors in an area which de-
mands a uniform federal maritime rule. Clearly, admiralty and
state law not only fail to conflict fatally, but are in complete agree-
ment on their common goal of insuring salvor honesty.'
Another conflict between salvage and state law may arise if too
great a diversity develops among the provisions of state antiquity
laws. However weakened the idea of federal uniformity has become,
a point may be reached when a profusion of wildly differing state
antiquity schemes will be deemed offensive to what vestiges of uni-
formity remain. The possibility of state regulations, by sheer num-
ber and uniqueness, posing a threat to general marine salvage seems
remote, however. Antiquities salvage as a subcategory of salvage is
just not that widespread. State laws do not differ radically in their
basic provisions, and any argument against state antiquity laws
predicated on uniformity violations is bound to beg the question if
it assumes, as a starting point, that vestiges of uniformity still re-
main of a strength sufficient to conflict with state law. It has already
been shown that the concept of federal uniformity has not evolved
into a mon6lithic assertion of jurisdiction over marine property.
Finally, state antiquity statutes may conflict with federal sal-
vage law because of their lack of precision in describing what sunken
property the state purports to own. On the face of several state
statutes, the state clearly claims title to all abandoned vessels and
objects of any type or age within its waters. Yet it would be an
impermissible burden on traditional salvage rights if a declaratory
opinion on ownership had to be obtained by every salvor working
within three or nine miles of the coast.'86 United States v. Diaz
suggests that even the phrase "objects of antiquity" may be too
vague to support a criminal conviction for illegal salvaging.)8 7 Reso-
lution of these problems should not prove difficult, however. Since
the problems are all definitional, they can be solved by adept redefi-
nition.
185. Cf. Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1947) (holding that the applica-
tion of the Michigan Civil Rights Act to a shipping company engaged in foreign commerce
did not contravene the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution); Allway Taxi, Inc. v.
City of New York, 340 F. Supp. 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (holding that a city ordinance requiring
exhaust emission controls was compatible with the Federal Clean Air Act.)
186. In United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960), the court construed the Submerged
Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1970), as not limiting a state's ownership of submerged
lands to within three miles of its coast, but as allowing the state's boundary to extend to nine
miles provided the existence of such a boundary is established in judicial proceedings.
187. 499 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974).
[Vol. 32:291
PROTECTING OUR CULTURAL RESOURCES
C. Suggested Interim Protective Measures
1. STATE LEGISLATION
It is apparent that some of the most significant objections to
state marine antiquities jurisdiction stem from the states' slavish
adherence to the notion that their interests must be asserted in the
form of property rights. If the states drafted marine antiquities leg-
islation more as an exercise of their police power and less as a form
of eminent domain,'88 the conflict with admiralty salvage, which is
itself strongly oriented toward concepts of possession and title,
would be largely diminished. It has already been demonstrated that
state antiquity statutes are defensible as consistent with admi-
ralty's activist bias. But continuing statutory references to state
title and ownership, and the spectres of physical possession these
terms invoke, create unnecessary nominal and substantive conflicts
with admiralty principles. State antiquities law, redrafted as asser-
tions of police and federal salvage law, would be providing different
remedies for different problems. Federal law would be applied, for
the most part, to nonantiquities salvage where traditional concepts
of rewarding salvors of property in impending maritime peril are
still very much alive. State antiquities recovery, in a distinctly
"maritime but local" context, would be conducted primarily for
historical purposes in situations bereft of significant maritime
peril. '89
State reliance on theories of antiquities ownership also places
entirely too much emphasis on the accident of an artifact's physical
location. Mere location of a marine artifact on state submerged
land, while unquestionably investing a state with significant and
protectable interests in its preservation, is an unrealistic basis for a
state's claim of exclusive property in the artifact. Some marine
artifacts, such as the Atocha, went down long before state political
boundaries were fixed. Others, like the US.S. Monitor, postdate the
188. See United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 1002-03 (5th Cir. 1977). See also
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948), in which the court stated: "The whole ownership
theory, in fact, is now generally regarded as but a fiction expressive in legal shorthand of the
importance to its people that a State have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of
an important resource." 334 U.S. at 402. McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127, 135 (1922). But see
Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 536-37 (1976).
189. A plausible argument could be formulated that marine antiquities recovery is too
far removed from traditional maritime and salvage pursuits to conflict with admiralty's
salvage jurisdiction. Borrowing liberally from Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleve-
land, 409 U.S. 249 (1972), one could argue that most artifact recovery is more an exercise in
archaeological and remote sensing technique than traditional salvage. The argument would
be strengthed if the contractual provisions governing artifact recovery in a given jurisdiction
partook of an employment rather than a "no cure, no pay" relationship.
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creation of state boundaries but are as much a part of national as
they are of local history. Thus, while marine artifacts, like minerals
or sedentary marine species, are physically confined within state
borders, their historical and cultural significance demands that they
be recognized as both national and local property.
Despite the clear national interest in marine antiquities, the
federal government has apparently defaulted in its duty to preserve
these nonrenewable cultural resources.""0 It is impossible to recog-
nize in uncodified federal admiralty principles a manifestation of a
paramount and preemptive federal interest in antiquities. Unlike.
the situation in Missouri v. Holland,"' where migratory birds were
not being protected by the states, here an irreplaceable national and
local resource is receiving inadequate protection at the hands of the
federal government.
Ultimately, the optimum cultural and historical yield from
marine antiquities might best be obtained through uniform national
regulation of marine antiquities salvage from the shore to the sea-
ward limit of the outer continental shelf. But until some coherent
national scheme of marine antiquities conservation embracing state
waters is formulated, state marine antiquity laws must be enacted
and strengthened. These laws must rest in doctrines that recognize
a wider public property interest in antiquities than the doctrines of
res nullius or res derelicta would allow. Marine antiquities must be
regarded as both national and local wealth over which states should
exercise their police power as trustees in the broader sense rather
than as titleholders or proprietors."2
In addition to minimizing friction with admiralty and more
realistically reflecting the fiduciary capacity in which states admin-
ister cultural properties of local and national significance, state an-
tiquity statutes redrafted as police power enactments will be the
190. The importance of. cultural resources to both the local and national populace pro-
vides a basis for regarding both as cotenants in the resource. If the national sovereign has
committed waste by its inaction, the local sovereign may still protect its citizens' full enjoy-
ment of the resource. See United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976).
191. 252 U.S. 416, 434-35 (1920).
192. This suggestion draws on the cotenancy analogy discussed in note 190 supra.
Whether marine antiquities are to be regarded as res communes, res publicae, res
universitatis or by some other latinism is of minor importance as long as the idea of a marine
artifact as something subject solely to limited ownership and control is dispelled. Cf. Greer
v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 525, 529, 535 (1896) (discussing state ownership of wild birds).
However, it cannot be contended that an assertion of a limited type of state ownership has
no place in an antiquities statute. Such an assertion may be a necessary predicate for an
interstate or foreign prosecution for stealing or receiving a marine artifact wrongfully removed
from United States coastal waters. See United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 1000-01 (5th
Cir. 1977).
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beneficiaries of an extremely favorable sequence of precedents.
These cases, such as Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of
Detroit,'93 Kelly v. Washington ex rel. Foss Co.,'94 and Skiriotes v.
Florida,9 ' tend to support the expansion of state police power and
the extension of state jurisdiction.
Skiriotes, in particular, resolves two jurisdictional problems in
favor of a broadened state competence over marine resources. In
territorial waters, in the absence of conflicting federal legislation, a
state has police power jurisdiction over resources in which it has a
legitimate interest. 99 In waters beyond state boundaries, again as-
suming a legitimate state interest and no preemptive federal pres-
ence, the state has prescriptive jurisdiction over the resource-related
activities of its citizens. 9 ' Skiriotes also permits a more expansive
definition of state citizenship that will include as a constructive
state citizen, not merely an actual state resident or domiciliary, but
any United States national acting beyond state borders who signifi-
cantly interacts with a resource in which the state is interested.'98
Finally, through the vehicle of Skiriotes and the police power
and commerce clause cases, a state can also assert an extraterrito-
rial resource jurisdiction to protect territorial resources under the
principle of the so-called "landing law" cases. These cases permit a
state to prohibit the in-state possession of extraterritorially ob-
tained resources, if the in-state and out-of-state resources are indis-
tinguishable.' Under the landing law principle, states may indi-
rectly but legitimately affect antiquities pilferage on the outer conti-
nental shelf beyond their borders since marine antiquities taken
legally beyond state borders are indistinguishable, unless their re-
covery has been officially witnessed, from those taken illegally
within state waters. Every coastal state with an antiquity law
should review the language and reach of its enactment in light of
193. 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
194. 302 U.S. 1 (1937).
195. 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
196. Id. at 75.
197. Id. at 77. Accord, Felton v. Hodges, 374 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1967).
198. State v. Bundrant, 546 P.2d 530, 554-56 (Alas. 1976), appeal dismissed sub nom.
Uri v. Alaska, 429 U.S. 806 (1976).
199. Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U.S. 422 (1936), wherein the court stated that:
[Resources] taken from waters within the jurisdiction of the state and those
taken from without are, of course, indistinguishable; and to the extent that the
act deals with the use or treatment of [resources] brought into the state from
the outside, its legal justification rests upon the ground that it operates as a shield
against the covert depletion of the local supply, and thus tends to effectuate the
policy of the law by rendering evasion of it less easy. 297 U.S. at 426. Hjelle v.
Brooks, 377 F. Supp. 430, 441 (D. Alas. 1974).
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Skiriotes and its aftermath, to insure that jurisdiction over infringe-
ment of its terms is not limited by state boundaries, or classes of
objects alone, but includes specific extraterritorial controls over its
natural and constructive citizens.
2. ADMIRALTY PRINCIPLES
In the absence of state statutory protection, there is no reason
to believe that traditional salvage concepts will protect marine anti-
quities from the private collector or the casual souvenir hunter.
While admiralty may feel that its system of recompense insures
rectitude, empirical evidence is lacking. Without statutory compul-
sions, there is no motivation for an antiquities salvor either to exca-
vate in an archeologically responsible manner or come before a court
of admiralty to share his finds with the public since the economics
of organized antiquities salvage virtually demand quick recovery
and a private market for whatever is recovered.00 Nor has admiralty
developed any procedures to insure that even those historical and
abandoned marine artifaits which are brought before it remain in
the public domain. Considering the likelihood of admiralty's con-
tinuing preeminence in antiquities salvage, particularly on the outer
continental shelf and in navigable waters of states without antiqui-
ties laws, two methods by which admiralty might become more
responsive to the problems of marine antiquities should be briefly
considered.
With minor rule changes admiralty could allow a state, the
federal government, a foreign government, or the subdivisions of
each, to assert possessory or proprietary interests in abandoned
marine artifacts. For the purpose of resolving contending claims to
them, the artifacts would be regarded as constructively derelict
rather than abandoned. In Platoro Ltd., Inc. v. Unidentified Re-
mains of a vessel,210 an admiralty salvage case, where ownership of
a Spanish vessel which sank in 1554 and its cargo was in dispute, a
monition was issued to the government of Spain. Apparently it was
never answered; however, the use of the monition hints at the possi-
bility of its wider application. 22 In all cases in which foreign origin
or ownership is reasonably suspected, the monition process may
200. See generally Note, Marine Archaeology and International Law: Background and
Some Suggestions, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 668, 688-700 (1972).
201. 371 F. Supp. 356, 359 (S.D. Tex. 1973) rev'd on other grounds, 508 F.2d 1113 (5th
Cir. 1975).
202. The broad power of admiralty to bring before it all claimants to the salvaged
property has long been recognized. Sturgis v. Law & St. John, 5 Super. Ct. 451, 459-60 (N.Y.
1850).
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provide the United States with a means of honoring its international
non-treaty cultural obligations. A healthier federalism would also
result if admiralty recognized, by monition, the reciprocal cultural
claims of the federal government and the state or states off whose
coasts the antiquities were found. If either the foreign government,
the federal government or the states failed to answer the monition,
an admiralty court could more readily justify a finding of abandon-
ment as salvage law defines that term.
A second area ripe for judicial improvisation is that of selective
adoption, by admiralty, of the non-conflicting features of state an-
tiquity statutes, particularly for antiquities recovery in a state's
territorial waters. If the proprietary assertions in state law are re-
pugnant to admiralty, perhaps the expressions of cultural concern
are not. Assuming the absence of an affront to surviving principles
of harmony and uniformity and the continuing integrity of tradi-
tional admiralty remedies, the interstices in admiralty's indifferent
approach to antiquities could be supplied by state substantive law.
Different problems would, of course, arise if admiralty were sitting
in a jurisdiction without an antiquities law, -or the antiquities were
recovered beyond state boundaries. Conversely, the issue arises
whether federal salvage law should be applied in state courts, both
in those jurisdictions with an antiquities law and those without one.
While federal salvage law can, and sometimes must, be applied by
state courts," the potential applicability of federal salvage princi-
ples to local antiquities recovery has not been explored.
VII. CONCLUSION
The recent abundance of statutory, judicial and executive ex-
pressions of concern over wasting cultural resources portends con-
tinuing efforts at their conservation. But presently, aside from pro-
tecting scattered marine sanctuaries and national seashores, the
federal effort to locate and preserve submarine artifacts has been,
at best, uncertain. As local and national resources, marine antiqui-
ties may ultimately receive their most effective protection from fed-
eral legislation. Such legislation, uniform in application from shore
to shelf-break, could help resolve the complex jurisdictional prob-
lems that have traditionally plagued federal/state conflicts over off-
shore resources. 04 Unfortunately, the trend, to the extent that one
203. See 0. F. Shearer & Sons, Inc. v. Decker, 349 F. Supp. 1214, 1220 (S.D.W. Va.
1972).
204. On an interim basis until a preemptive federal scheme could be implemented, or
as a permanent complement to state antiquities regulations in territorial waters, the federal
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is discernible, is not towards the uniform federal regulation of anti-
quities recovery. Admiralty salvage jurisdiction remains comforta-
bly unchallenged by superceding federal legislation despite the sus-
pected ineffectiveness of admiralty in protecting submerged cul-
tural artifacts.
State statutes are the one bright feature on an otherwise dismal
marine horizon, although no reported cases have yet discussed their
strengths or limitations. Certainly it is reasonable to predict that
while state legislation will not fully protect the cultural resources of
the outer continental shelf, it will afford more effective protection
than admiralty within state waters, and neither in state waters nor
on the outer continental shelf do the customary factual settings and
legal aspects of antiquities salvage require a confrontation between
state antiquities laws and admiralty salvage principles.
Short of a cultural awakening by admiralty, irrefutable proofs
of the unconstitutionality of state antiquity laws, or a uniform fed-
eral legislative program, all of which are unlikely, it is suggested
that the balance between the two sovereigns be struck, at least on
an interim basis, in favor of state regulation.
government could easily move to protect marine antiquities on the outer continental shelf.
Deriving power from the Property Clause of the Constitution, Congress could amend the
Antiquities Act or redefine federal jurisdiction in The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act to
empower the Secretary of the Interior to regulate shelf antiquities recovery. It is far from clear
that the Secretary does not already possess the requisite rule-making power in this area
pursuant to the two Acts, as written, or Exec. Order No. 11,593, 3 C.F.R. § 559 (1971-1975
Compilation). The Geological Survey, an agency of the Department of the Interior, presently
requires that subsurface reconnaissance, testing and drilling operations on the outer continen-
tal shelf show due regard for the presence of cultural resources. 30 C.F.R. § § 251.8(b), 251.9(d)
(1976).
In light of the federal government's limited reservation of commerce, navigation, defense
and foreign affairs powers in state waters (Submerged Lands Act § 1314(a)), it is also interest-
ing to ponder what the basis for federal antiquities preemption in state waters would be.
Authority for antiquities salvage, unlike fishery regulation, does not rest in the Commerce
Clause (Compare Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 45 U.S.L.W. 4488 (1977) with The
Belfast, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 624, 640-41 (1868)), and is only remotely related to the other powers
reserved in the Submerged Lands Act. But see Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 204-06 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971).
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